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In Bank.

Apr. 7, 1960.]

lWSS MESSNER, Respondent, v. JOURNEYMEN BARBERS, HAIRDRESSERS AND COSMETOLOGISTS,
INTEHNATIOXAIJ l.1NTON OF AMERICA, LOCAIJ
256, et a1., Appellants.
[1] Labor-Picketing-Law Governing.-A case involving the right

[2]

[3]

[4]

[5]

[6]

of a union to picket a barber shop to secure a union shop
agreement must be decided under state law, since a barber is
not engaged in interstate eOUlmerce.
Id. - Right of Union to Engage in Concerted Activities. - A
union Ulay use the various forms of concerted action, such as
strike, picketing or boycott, to enforce an objective that is
reasonably related to any legitimate interest of organized labor.
Id.-Object of Concerted Labor Activity.-The object of concerted labor activity JlJust be proper and must be sought by
lawful means, oth('rwise the persons injured by such activity
JlJay obtain damages or injunctive relief.
Id.-Collective Bargaining Contracts.-Employers are not r('quired by law to engage in collective bargaining, and closed or
union shop agreements and concerted activities to achieve them
are lawful whether or not a majority of the ('mployees directly
involved wish such agl'eements.
Id. - Right of Union to Enga.ge in Concerted Activities. - The
members of a labor organization llIay have a substantial interest ill the employment relations of nn employer although none
of them is or ever was employed by him, and whel'e union and
nonunion employees arc engaged in a similar occupation and
their respective elllplo~'ers are engaged in trade competition
with each other, the union's efforts to extend its membership
to the employments in which it has no foothold is not an unreasona ble aim.
Id. - Right of Union to Engage in Concerted Activities. - A
union may use economic pressurc to achieve a closed or union
shop agreement though the employees in the picketed shop do

[2] See Ca.l.Jur.2d, Labor, § 74 et seq.; Am.Jur., Labor, § 372
et seq.
McK. Dig. References: [1, 12] Labor, § 23; [2, 3, 5-7] Labor,
§20a: [4] Labor, §3a: [8] Labor, §18; [9,10,18] Labor, §21;
[11] Labor, § 1.1; [13] :Monopolies and Combinations, §§ 1, 5:
[14~ Monopolies and Combinations, § 6; [15-17] Monopolies and
Comhinations, § 7.
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not belong to the union and hnve no dispute with their employer.
[7] ld.-Right of Union' to Engage in Concerted Activities.-The
hardship arising from a labor union's struggle for organizntion does not render less legitimnte the objectives of the union
in seeking orgnnization or the objectives of a nonunion shop
in resisting it, or the objectives of nonunion workers who may
either join or resist. Confronted with the legitimate objectives
of all parties concerned in such a struggle, it is not for the
courts to abate it, however aware they may be of its inevitable
hardships; they are bound to remain aware also that they cnnnot properly encroach on the function of regulation that
belongs to the Legislature.
[8] ld.-Labor Unions-Closed or Union Shop Agreements.-Lab.
Code, §§ 920, 921, 923, relating to promises to join or remain
in or withdraw from a labor organization and to public policy
as to labor organizations, do not affect the propriety of closed
or union shop agreements and concerted activities to obtain
such agreements.
[9] ld.-Jurisdietional Strikes-Labor Organizations.-Under Lab.
Code, §§ 1117, 1118, relating to jurisdictional strikes, a labor
organization is not formed merely by an agl'eement of employees not to be organized. A group whose sole purpose is to
express the wish of its members not to deal as a group with
the employer "concerning grievances, Inbor disputes, wages,
hours of employment or conditions of work" is not an organization that exists for the purposes of § 1117, since it lacks
the purpose "of denling with employers concerning grievances,
labor disputes, wages, hours of employment or conditions of
work."
[10] ld.-Jurisdictional Strikes-Labor Organizations.-A jurisdictional strike cnn only arise out of a "controversy between
two or more labor organizntions as to which of them has or
should have the exclusive right to bargain collectively with an
employer ... [01') to Ilfiye its JIll'lllbers perform work for an
employer" (Lab. COUI', § 1118) ; the wish of all or some of the
employees to work ill nn open shop without collective bargaining is the antithesis of a demand for the "exclusive right to
have [their) members pl'rform work for [the) employer."
[11] ld.-Legislative Policy.-With the exception of enactments
outlawing the employer's usc of the yellow-dog contract (Lab.
Coue, §§ 920-922) and labor's usc of the jurisdictional strike
(Lab. Code, ~§ 1115-1122), the legislative policy favors free
competition for jobs by lawful, peaceful means.
[12] ld.-Picketing.-If plaintiff nonunion barber was offl'reu the
same rights of unionlllelllbership as the elllploYl'e melllbers, de-
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fend ants' peaceful picketing to compel him to join the union
was proper because the businessman-worker operating in an
industry or field in which he c,ompetes with organized workmen
Dlay be subjected to the same means of persuasion as any
other workman to join the union and conform to the conditions regulating union labor.
[13] Monopolies and Combinations - Restraint of Trade: Cartwright Act.-Combinations entered into for the purpose of restraining competition and fixing prices are unlawful under the
common law and the Carhnight Act. (Bus. & Prof. Code,
§ 16700 et seq.)
[14] Id. - Cartwright Act - Agreements and Combinations Prohibited.-Although human labor is not a "commodity" under
the Cartwright Act (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 16703), a service
consisting in the main of human labor is.
[15] Id. - Cartwright Act - Agreements and Combinations Prohibited.-Bus. & Prof. Code, § 16703, is not limited to exempting from the Cartwright Act agreements that set the price of
labor; reasonably interpreted it was intended to except from
the operation of the act combinations of laborers for purposes
of furthering their interests by collective bargaining, when
not otherwise unlawful.
[16] Id.-Cartwright Act-Labor Unions.-A labor union, acting
alone, yiolates the CartwrigM Act only when its primary purpose is to accomplish a restraint of trade, not when its purpose
is to obtain a valid labor objective.
[17] Id.-Cartwright Act-Labor Unions.-Where a minimulll
price schedule in a union shop agreement setting percentll~e
wages for barbers was not price-fixing but wage-fixing, thc
presence of employer-barbers in the union did not convert
the contract into an agreement between III bor groups and nonlabor groups for the purpose of restraining trade.
[18] Labor-Jurisdictional Strikes-Financial Factors.-The purpose of Lab. Code, § 1122, in the Jurisdictional Strike Act, providing that "any person who organizes an employee group
",·hich is financed in whole or in part, interfered with or dominated or controlled by the employer or any employer associntion, as well as such employer assocjation, shall be liable to
suit by any person who is injure.d thereby," is to give an action
for damllges to any person injured by the formation of a coJ)Jpany union. Employers arc prohibited from financing labor
unions hec:.nlsc such finllncing might render a union less indl'pendent and thus lc!'s able to represent its members efi'ectin·l.\·
[13] Sec Cal.Jur.2d, Monopolies, Combinations and Restraint"
of Trade, § 3 et seq.

)
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vis-a-vis the employer; but where the employer is himself a
workman, his dues are no different from those of nny other
member and would not give him control over union power lind
policy.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San
Diego County. James C. Toothaker, Judge. Reversed.
Action to enjoin defendants from picketing a barber shop.
Judgment for plaintiff reversed.
Todd & Todd and Henry C. Todd for Appellants.
Carroll, Davis, Burdick & MeDonough, Roland C. Davis,
John E. Thorne, Johnson, Thorne, Speed & Bamford, Morgan,
Beauzay, Smith & Holmes, R()brrt Morgan, Charles P. Scully
and Victor Van Bourg as Amiei Curiar on behalf of Appellants.
Gray, Cary, Amcs & 1<'rye and Ward W. 'Vaddell, Jr., for
Respondent.
Severson, Davis & Larson, Nathan R. Berke and George
Brunn as Amici Curiae on behalf of Respondent.
TRAYNOR, J.-Defendants appeal from a judgment of the
trial court enjoining them from picketing plaintiff's barbl'r
shop to secure a union shop agreement.
Plaintiff is a barber, working with the tools of the tradt'.
During the summer of 1957 dl'fcIHlants attempted to organi;,:e
all the barber shops in the San Diego area. They submitted II
contract to plaintiff that would have required him and Ids
four barber employees to join defendants' organization. Drfendants did not represent an;y of plaintiff's employees, awl
the employees do not wish to join the uuion or to be represented by defendants. Plaintiff's refusal to sign the contract
led to drfendants' praceful picketing'. After about a week the
pickets were removed by stipulation pending the decision
in this case.
[1] Since plaintiff is not rllgaged ill interstate commerce,
tllis case must be decided ul1l1rr state law. [2] It is clear
that "a union ma~' use the various forms of concerted action,
such as strike, picli:/'ting, or boycott, to enforce an objective
that is reasonably related to allY legitimate interest of organized labor .. '. [3] It is equally well settled that the object

)

)

Apr. ]960]

MESSNER 1'. JOUR~EYMEN nARBERS ETC.
INTERNATIONAL UNION

87i

153 C.2d 873; 4 Cal.Rptr. 179, 351 P.2d 347J

of concerted labor activity must be proper and that it mnst
be sought by lawful meanf;, otherwise the persons injured by
such activity may obtain damages or injunctive relief."
(James v. Marinship Corp., 25 Ca1.2d 721, 728-729 [155 P.2tl .
329, 160 A.L.R. 900] and cases cited.) If defendants' peaceful picketing was diree1ed toward a proper object, the injunction was erroneously granted. The crucial issue in this case,
therefore, is whether a closed or union shop agreement is a
proper objective of a labor union that does not represent any
of the employees directly involved.
That issue was decided in C. S. Smith Met. Market Co. v.
Lyons, 16 Cal.2d 3Be [106 P.2d 414], and McKoy v. Retail
Automobile S. L. U'fIwn No. 1067, 16 Cal.2d 311 [106 P.2d
373], and ''I'as reaffirmed in Petri Clefmers, 111c. v. Automotive
Employees, etc. Local No. 88, ante, pp. 455, 474-475 [2 Cal.
Rptr. 470, 349 P.2d 76]. [4] In the course of holding in
the Petri case that an employer was not required to bargain
collectively with a union representing a majority of his employees, this court said: •• [w] e conclude that employers are
not required by law to engage ill collective bargaining and
that closed or union shop agreements and concerted activities
to achieve them are lawful in this state whether or not a
majority of the employees directly involved wish such agreements." Since the concerted activities in the Petri case werc
conducted by a union that represented a majority of the employees at the time the activities began, we were there COllcerned with the issue of this case only inferentially. We
deem it appropriate to set forth the law on this issue by a
detailed discussion of the controlling authorities.
As early as J. F. Parki'flson Co. v. Buildi'flg Trades 001l'f1cil
(1908),154 Cal. 581 [98 P. 1027,16 Ann.Cas. 1165,21 L.R.A.
N.S. 550], this court held that it was not unlawful for a union
to call a strike of employees and order a boycott to bring
pressure on an employer who retained a nonunion worker and
thereby to enforce a closed shop. The elimination of the competition of nonunion workers was held a proper objective of
concerted labor activity, and the court was unanimous in ho1t1·
ing a strike a proper metllOd of attaining this end. The conclusion of the Parkinson case that a closed shop is a proper
labor objective was reaffirmed in Pierce v. Stablemen's Unio'fl,
156 Cal. 70 f]03 P. 324], even though the picketing in that
case was enjoined because it involved force and violence.
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The preeise issue of this case was raised and decidpd in
C. S. Smith Met. 1Ilm·ltd Co. v. Lyolls, 16 Ca1.2d 389 [106
P.2d 414], a suit to restrain a union from pitlwting and boycotting a food market to organize the nonunion butchers antl
to obtain a closed shop agreement. No labor dispute f'xisted
between the employer and the butchers in that case alld nOlle
of them wished to join the picketing union. [ 5 ] 'l'he court
held that the concerted activity was proper because "[ t] he
members of a labor organization may have a substantial
interest in the employment relations of an employer although
none of them is or ever has been employed by him. The reason
for this is that the employment relations of every employer
affect the working conditions and bargaining power of employees throughout the industry in which he competes. Hence,
where union and nonunion employees are engaged in a similar
occupation and their respectiYe employers are engaged in trade
competition one with another, the efforts of the union to extend
its membership to the employments in which it has no foothold
is not an unreasonable aim." (l d., at 401.)
In McKay v. Reta,il Automobile S. L. Union No. 1067, 16
Ca1.2d 311 [lOG P.2d 373], this court held that a labor union
that represented none of an employer's salesmen could lawfully engage in concerted activity to obtain a closed shop
agreement since that objective had a reasonable relation to
the betterment of the conditions of labor. Substantially the
same conclusion was reached in L'U1ld v. Auto 'Mechanics Union
No. 1414,16 CaL2d 374, 378 [106 P.2d 408].
In Shafer v. Registered Pharmadsts U11ion, 16 Ca1.2d 379
[106 P.2d 403], involving a strike by plaintiff's union pharmacists to obtain a closed shop agreement, the propriety of the
closed shop as a labor objective under common-law principles
was conceded and the crueial question was whether sections
920, 921, and 923 of the Labor Code outlawed closed shop
agreements. Recognizing that tllese sections were enacted
to outlaw yellow-dog contracts, the court held that they "lay
no statutory restraints upon the workers' efforts to secure a
elosed shop contract from an employer .... " (ld .• at 388.)
In Sontag Clwin Stores Co. v. Supcri01' Court, 18 Ca1.2d 92
[113 P.2d 689], the court followed its earlier decisions by
holding that the superior court had exceeded its jurisdiction
in permanently restraining a union from peacefully picketing
to obtain a union shop agrE'ement. [6] The principle that
a union may use economie pressure to aCllieye a closed or union

)
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shop agreement even though the employees in the picketed shop
do not belong to the union and have no dispute with their employer, established in the foregoing case8, has been restated in
many cases not directly concerned with the point. (Magill Bros.
v. Buildi1lg Servi.cc etc. Union, 20 Ca1.2d 506, 508 [127 P.2d
542] ; James v. Marinship OOl·p., 25 Ca1.2d 721, 730 [15::> P.2d
329, 160 .A.L.R. 900] ; Parl;; & T. I. Oorp. v. Inie1'1lOtiollal clc.
o! Teamsters, 27 Ca1.2d 599, 604 [165 P.2d 891, 162 A.T.J.n.
1426] and cases cited; DeUillc v. American Fed. of Rad1'o
Artists, 31 Ca1.2d 139, 144-145 [187 P.2d 769, 175 A.L.R. 382] ;
Oha7'les H. Benton, Inc. v. Painters U1lion, 45 Ca1.2d 6i7, 683
[291 P.2d 13] ; see F'ol·tcnbury v. S1lper·ior Court, 16 Ca1.2d
405, 409 [106 P.2d 411]; Williams Y. International etc. of
Boilermakers, 27 Ca1.2d 586 [165 P.2d 903]; Thompson v.
Moore Drydock 00., 27 Ca1.2d 595 (165 P.2d 901].)
'1'hus, for 50 years, until the four-to-three decision of this
court in Garmon v. Sa.n Dicuo BlIil(?i1IU Trades C01l1lcil, 49
Ca1.2d 595 [320 P.2d 473], in 1958, it was the settled law of
this state that union labor could freely compete for jobs in
the labor market and seek to improve wages and working COIlditions by engaging in lawful concerted activities such as
strikes and picketing. The law moreover recognized that union
labor has a legitimate interest in organizing workmen in competing nonunion shops to insure the benefits of collective bargaining in union shops. Concerted activities such as picketing
to acllieve that goal were legitimate even when the employees
in the nonunion shops did not wish to join or to be represented
by the union. Just as the union had to reckon with tIle risk
that it might lose its struggle for organization, so the nonunioll
employer rislted loss of business, and hence his emplo~'ecs
risked 108s of employment, in resisting organization.
Such risks, grim as they are, are the price of lawful competition in a free enterprise system. The union plays for the
high stakes of holding the gains it has made in union shops.
The nonunion shop pla~'s for the high stakes of holding the
competitive advantages it liaS again8t union shops. The nOllunion workers must tlwn deeide between alternatives neither
of which is of their own ('hoosing. They may welcome organization or merely accede to it a8 the lesser of two evils. On the
other hand they may dislike organization, or merel~' regard
it as a lost cause, or resist it out of fear of losing wl1at the~'
presently hold or out of lJop(' that tlJ('y wi1l f'ml'rg<' as free-

~80

MI·:"';;;:,\I·:n

1' • •1"I·H:\I·:nn::,\ BARBERS ETC.
INTERNATIONAL UNION

jG:3 <.'.:2.1

riding benefil'iaries of ol'ganizations which their fellows "ill
join and support.
In the aos(')]('(' of ~talutory regulation the struggle can be
bitterly hard on all sides. [7] The hardship does 110t
render less legitimate the objectives of the union in seekillg
organization or the objectives of the nonunion shop ill resisting it, or the objectives of the nonunion workers who may
either join or resist. Confronted with the legitimate objectives
of all parties concerned in such a strugglc, it is not for tIle
courts to abate it, however keenly aware they may be of its
inevitable hardships. They are bound to remain aware also
that they cannot properly encroach upon the function of
regulation that belongs to the Legislature.
In Ohavez v. Sargent, 52 Ca1.2d 162 [339 P.2d 801], however, a majority of this court ignored the traditional doctrine
of separation of powers to write a state law of labor relatiolls
based on the Taft-Hartley Act. That case suggested that many
of the earlier cases had been superseded by the subsequent
enactment of the Jurisdictional Strike Act (Lab. Code, §§ 11151120, 1122). That conclusion was reached by interpreting
section 1117, which defines a labor organization as "any
organization or any agency or employee represcntation committee or any local unit thereof in which employees participate,
and exists for the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with
employers concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, hours
of employment or conditions of work, which labor organization is not found to be or to have been financed in whole or
in part, interfered with, dominated or controlled by the employer or any employer association within one year of the
commencement of any proceeding brought under this chapter ... " to appl:r to a group of unorganized, nonunion employees who are satisfird with their terms and conditions of
employment and therefore do not wish to enga.ge in collective
bargaining. (Ohavez v. Sargent, wpm, at 197-203.) The controversy between this unorganized group and a national labor
organization as to whether the forJlH'r shall join tIle union was
then converted into a jurisdictional strikr, defined by seetion
1118 as "a concerted refusal to perform work for an employer
or any other concerted interference with an employer's operation or business, arising out of a controversy between two or
more labor organizations as to which of them has or should
have the exclusive right to bargain collectively with an employrl' on behalf of his emplo~'ers or any of them ... [or] to

)
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llave its members perform work for an employer" so as to
make the act applicable to the fact situations of the 1\feKay,
Shafer, Lyons and Fort('nhury cases, supra.
Even under the Cliauc:: interpretation of the act, however,
its terms cannot possibly apply to the Shafer and Fodcnbw'Y
situations. In Sh(lf er, all of plaintiff's 14 pharmacists and
assistant pharmacists who were eligible for memb('rship were
union members and all but one wanted the closed shop agreement. In Fortcnbury, the strike was conducted by employees
of the shop as well as other ullion members. There was no
question in either case of a dispute between rival labor organizations; the only dispute was between the employees and the
employer. [8] The Shafer case therefore established that
sections 920, 921, and 923 of the Labor Code do not affect the
propriety of closed or union shop agreements and concerted
activities to obtain such agreements. (See Park & T. I. Corp.
v. International etc. of Teamsters, 27 Cal.2d 599, 609-613
l165 P.2d 891, 162 A.L.R. 1426].)
There is some reason, however, for the suggestion that the
:McKay case, supra, has been superseded by the act because
the employees in tbat case had formed an inside union. The
court held, however, that the employees had failed to sustain
the burden of proving that their organization was a "bona
fide independent labor union." (ld., at 329-330.) Whether
the act has superseded tllat case on its facts therefore depends
on whcther the employee group was finaneed, interfered with,
dominated or controlled by the employer. (Lab. Code, § 1117.)
The act did not supersede the Lyons case, supra, however.
[9] rnd!'r s('diollS ] 117 and 1118 of the Labor Code a labor
organization is not formed merely by an agreement of emplo~'ees not to be organized. A group whose sole purpose is
to express th(' wish of its memhers not to deal as a group with
the employer "concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages,
hours of employment or conditions of work" is not an organization that exists for the pnrpos('s of section 1117, for it lacks
the purpose "of dealing with employers eoncerning grieval1Ce~, labor disputes, wu:res, hours of employment or conditions of work." (IJab. Code, § 1117.) Moreover, even if such
a group eould be a labor organization und('r section 1117, its
objection to organization of the SllOP could not give rise to a
jurisoil·tional strike within the meaning of section 1118.
[10] StH'h a st1'ikp call only arise out of a "eontroversy
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between two or more labor organizations as to which of thl'1l1
has or should have tIle exclusive right to bargain eolledively
with an employer ... [or] to have its members pC'rform work
for an employer." (Lab. Codl', § 1118.) The wish of all or
some of the employees to work in an open shop without collective bargaining is thc very antithesis of a dl'mnnd for the
"exclusive right to have [their] members perform work for
[the] employer."
In 1960, in Petri Cleaners, Inc. v. Automotive Employees,
etc. Local No. 88, ante, p. 455 [2 Cal.Rptr. 470, 349 P.2d
76], the court disapproved the sweeping pronouncement of
the Chavez ease and retraced its steps to the stare decisis of
half a century, reaffirming the cumulative decisions from 1908
to 1958.
When it made that reaffirmation the court was mindful that
no decision was possible that would not entail some hardship.
Nevertheless it felt bound to respect the traditional principle
of separation of powers that gives to the Legislature the responsibility of making any major changes in social and economic policy. It made clear that the court would not establish
by judicial legislation a little Taft-Hartley Act for California
that only tIle Legislature can properly consider and enact.
The Legislature is uniquely able to amass economic data and
110ld hearill~s w11ere it can give heed to many representatives
of the public besides parties to a eontroversy. It ean best
determine whether there should be further governmental
]'C'g"ulation of peaeeful competitive economic activity.
[11] The Legislature has so far acted not only to outlaw
thl' emplo~n'r's use of the yellow-dog contract (Lah. Code,
~§ 920-922) hut also labor's use of the jurisdictional strike
(Lab. Codl', §§ ]]]5-1]22.) With the exception of these practices the present legislative policy favors free eompetition for
jobs by lawful peaceful means. Additional restrictions fiuch
as those contained in "right-to-work" laws or little TaftHartley acts have been defeated hy the pcople or tl1e Legislature/ although they are alwa~Ts open to rl'consideration.
'The California policy of course differs from policies of statcs with
c1ifferent statutory proyisions. Twenty states haye "right·to-work" laws
that prollibit union security contracts. (See disspnting opinion llcrein,
footnote 7.) 'l'en other states have statutes spedfically requiring that
union security contracts be supported by a majority vote of the em·
ployees directly involved. These states, all except Hawaii cited in foot·
note 4 of the dis~enting opinion herein, include Colorado (Rev. Stais.
§ 80·5·(j (c), requiring approval of three·quarters); Connectieut (Gen.

)
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The P('tri case reaffirmed the traditional separation of powers
that compels the judiciary to keep it'S distance from major
formulations of policy.
This court's interpretation of section 923 of the Labor Code
(Shaje7' Y. Registc7'cd Pharma.cisis Ul1iol1, s1lpra) is in accord
with tIle United States Supreme Court's interpretation of a
similar provision of the Taft-Hartley Act. (§ 7, 29 U.S.C.
§ 157.) Pointing out that " [b] asic to the right guaranteed
to employ('C's in § 7 to form, join or assist labor organizations,
is the right to engage in concerted activities to persuade other
emplo~'ees to join for their mutual aid and protection" the
l;nit('d States Supreme Court, after a review of the legislative
materials, held that peaceful picketing for recognition by n
union that does not represent a majority of the employees is
not an unfair labor practice under § 8(b) (1) (A). (N.L.R.B,
v. Dril'Cl's' Loca,l 639, 362 U.S. 274 [80 S.Ct. 706, 4 L.Ed.2d
710]; 28 U.S.TJ. Week 4217, 4219, 4222, March 28, 1960.)
The court's opinion makes plain that the Labor-Management
Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 does not " . . . relegate
this litigation to the status of an unimportant controversy over
the meaning' of a statute which has been significantly
changed." (ld., at 4218.)
Sil1('e the judgment must be reversed, we deem it appropriatc to settle several questions of law that may arise on
Stats. ~ 31-10;;(5), 31-106(a»; Hawaii (1959 Session Laws, Act. 210,
p. 141); Idaho (Code, § 44-107, 1959 Supp.); Kansas (Gen. Stnt. ~ 44·
80!) (4), also ine1uded in the 20 states with "right-to-work" laws
and not cOllnted in these ten); Massachusetts (Ann. Laws, eh. 150A,
§~ 4(3) and 5); Miclligan (Stat. Ann. § 17. 454 (15»; Minnesota
(P-!nt. Aun. H 170.12 (3), 179.16 (1); New York (Laws Ann. I'h. 31,
H 70'" (,,) 701;); Pennsylvania (Stats. Ann. tit. 43, §§ 211.6 (1) (e),
~11.7 (:1); :md Wisconsin (Stat, Ann. § 111.06 (1) (c». Six states not
ot1l('rwi~(' nr~ount('tl for and having only a provision more or less similar
to s('ct ion (123 of th(' California Labor Code rea~h a result contrary to
t1mt of Shafer v. RrgilJtcrcd Pharmacists Union, s1/pra. (Kentuc1Q',
Main(', Mis~ouri, New Jersey, Washington and Wyoming. See eases
I'ited in footnote 4 of the dissenting opinion herein.) Of the remaining
thirt('('n stnt('s, six hm'c no specific st.atutes and of these three (Ncw
l\f('xiro, R110cle Island, nnn West Virginia) support the majority view
in tlli~ ens(' while threc (Ohio. Illinois, and perhaps New Hampshire)
snpport thc diss('nt's "i('w. (8('c footnotes 6 and 8 of dissenting opinion
hert'in. Thc Xcw lTampsllire I'n~c is unclear as to whether the union hall
majorit~· snpport. That it 1md some support from the employees is clear.
rWhite :Mt. Free::rr Co. v. lIfllrph11] 78 N.H. 398 [101 A. 357, 358].) Of
the remaining scwn staTes, six nppnrcntly havc not Jlllssed on the point
(A1n.I,a, De1aw:1re, lIfnTyland, Oklahoma, Vermont. and Mont:1na); allil
on!' (Oregon) has r(')1<'n1('d its 1nhoT rplntions statutc and not "ct enaetpd
anoth!'r (Ore. Laws, 191i!1, eh. ,jl;, ~ ]). Thus, nine states witl;out special
ltatutes are opposed to the California position.
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remand. (Code Civ. Proc., § 53.) The picketing ill this case
was for a dual purpose: to achieve a union shop agreement
and to compel plaintiff, as a barber working with the tools
of the trade, to join the union. Despite the parties' contrary
assumption, it is not clear whether the trial court enjoine(l
picketing for the latter purpose. The judgment reads in part
"[t]hat the defendants and each of them be and they hereby
are enjoined from picketing the plaintiff's place of business ...
in order to compel the plaintiff to execute the form of agreement demanded by them or any other form of agreement, requiring the plaintiff to compel his employees to join the Defendant Union against the will of the said employees."
After defendants' national union amended its constitution
to require that all barbers who work with the tools of the
trade become members of a local union or an employers' guild,
the courts of many states were called upon to determine
whether a businessman-worker could properly be required to
join a workman's union. Since many of the barber shops involved in these test cases had operated as union shops before
the amendment, several of the cases took the form of actions
by the union to recover its union shop card or by the employerbarber to retain the card. Some of the cases, therefore, hold
only that the union may recover the card as an article of
property and do not decide whether the employer-barber may
be required to join thc union. (H cad Y. Local Union No. 83,
Journeymen Barbers, 262 Ala. 84, 87-89 [77 So.2d 363] ; Rainwater v. Trimble, 207 Ga. 306, 307-308 [61 S.E.2d 420];
Journeymen BaI'bers, Hairdresscrs, etc., Local 687 v. Pollino,
22 N.J. 389, 398-401 [126 A.2d 194] ; Foutts v. Journeymell
BorbC1'S, 155 Ohio St. 573, 577-581 [99 N.E.2d 782] ; cf. Wisconsin Employ. Rel. Board v. Journeymen Barbers, 272 Wi~.
84,90-94 [74 N.W.2d 815].) One case holds that the payment
of union dues and fees by an employer constitutes the COlltribution of financial support to the union in violation of
state statutes. (Journeymen Barbers eic., Local Uni01l No. 20;1
v. Industrial Comm., 128 Colo. 121, 131-132 [260 P.2d 94]].)
A third group of cases decides on the merits either that a
union may properly require that a businessman-worker who
competes with union labor join the union (COOllS v. J 01lrl1e1/71/e1l Barbers, 222 Minn. 100, 102-]05 [23 N.Vt.2d 345];
Romero v. Journeymen Barbers, 63 N.M. 443, 444-447 [321
P.2d 628]) or that it may not do so (1(erkemcyer v. Jlfidlrifj,
- - Mo. - - [299 S.W.2d 409, 417] ; Grimaldi v. Local No.9,

Apr. 1960]

MESSNER V. JOUItXEL\lE:-\ TI,mBERs ETC.
IN'TERNATIONAL UNION

885

[53 C.2d 873; 4 Cal.Rptr. l?~. 351 P.2d 347]

JOU1"ncymen Barbers, 397 Pa. 1 [153 A.2d 214, 215], cert.
den., 361 U.S. 901 [80 S.Ct. 210, 4 L.Ed.2d 157].)
[12] The law of California is that if plaintiff was offered
the same rights of union mt·mbership as the elllplo.n'e members
(Riviello Y. Journeymen Bm'be'/"s etc. Union, 88 Cal.App.2d
499, 504-507 [199 P.2d 400] ; second opinion, 109 Cal.App.2d
]23,124,129 [240 P.2d 361]), defendants' peaceful picketing
to compel him to join the union was proper because" [t]he
businessman-worker operating in an industry or field in which
he competes with organized workmen may likewise be subjected to the same means of persuasion as any other workman
to join the union and conform to the conditions regulating
union labor." (Bautista v. Jones, 25 Ca1.2d 746, 749 [155
P.2d 343] ; see Emde v. San Joaquin Oounty etc. Oou?lCil, 23
Cal.2d 146, 155 [143 P.2d 20, 150 A.L.R. 916].) Saleway
Stores v. Retail Olerks etc . ..4.SS1l., 41 Ca1.2d 567 [261 P.2d 721],
is not to the contrary. That case holds that organized labor
may not, consistently with public policy, require store managers who are agents of management to divide their loyalties
by becoming union members. (ld., at 575.) Plaintiff owes no
loyalty to any principal and thus will not be placed in the same
position as the store managers by becoming a union member.
Moreover, the store managers did not normally perform the
same duties as the store clerks in the Safeway case (ld., at 572)
and thus did not compete directly with the union members.
Plaintiff, by choosing to compete on the same level as union
barbers, threatens the union-won scale of terms and conditions,
even if he voluntarily adheres to the same or a higher scale
(see O. S. Smith Met. Market 00. v. Lyons, 16 Ca1.2d 389,
401 [106 P.2d 414]).
Plaintiff contends that since employer-barbers and proprietor-barbers are members of the union, defendant union is
not merely a labor organization but also a price~:fixing organization of employers. The union contract, offered to plaintiff in
this case, sets the weekly wage of a full-time journeyman
barber at 70 per cent of his gross receipts with a guaranteed
minimum of $50 per week. Clause 13 provides that" [w] herea!>
wages are paid on a percentage basis the prices to be charged
under this Agreement in all Union barber shops not to be less
than the following: [listing the prices for barber shop sen"ices]. "
[13] Combinations entered into for the purpose of l'Pstraining competition and fixing prices are unlawful in this
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state under the common law (Speegle v. Board of Fi1'c Underwriters, 29 Cal.2d 34,44 [172 P.2d 867]) and the Cnl'twrigllt
.Ad. (Bus. & Prof. ('0<1<" § 16700 et seq.) [14] Although
human labor is not a "commodity" under the ad (§ 16703),
a service consisting in the main of human labor is. (People \'.
Building Maintena11ce etc. Assn., 41 Ca1.2d 719, 723 [264 P.2(1
31].) [15] Section 16703, however, is not limited to exempting from the act agreements that set the price of labor.
"Reasonably interpreted, [it] must be held to have been intended to except from the operation of the act combinatiolls
of laborers for the purposes of furthering their interests
by collective bargaining, when not otherwise unlawful."
(Schweizer Y. Local Joint Executive Board, ]21 Ca1.App.2d
45,53 [262 P.2d 568].) Accordingly, "the real test in a particular case is the primary purpose of the agreement or combination in question." (Schweizer v. Local Joint Executive
Bom-d, supra, at 53.) [16] Thus, a labor union, acting
alone, violates tIle Cartwright Act only when its primary purpose is to accomplish a restraint of trade (Alpha Beta Food
Mkts. v. Amalgamated Meat Cutters, 147 Cal.App.2d 343,
345-346 r305 P.2d 163] ; ](old Kist v. Amalgamated !lleat Cutters, 99 Cal.App.2d 1Hl, 198-199 [221 P.2d 724] ; cf. O'Shea
v. Tile Layers Um'oll, 155 CaI.App.2d 373, 376-377 [318 P.2d
102] ; Miracle Adhesit·cs Cm'p. Y. Peninsula Tile Confr. Assn.,
157 Cal.App.2d 59], 594-595 [321 P.2d 482] ; see also Saveall
v. Demers, 322 Mass. 70,72-73 [76 N.E.2d 12] ; Commonwealth
v. McHugh, 326 Mass. 249, 26:)-264 [93 N.E.2d 751] ; Purcell
v. Journeymen Barbas, 234 l\Io.App. 843, 860 [133 S.W.2d
662] ; but see Cleaners, Dyers, de. Union v, G.H.1Y. CleallN's
&: D., 200 La. 83, 90-91 [7 So.211 623] ), not wIlen its purpose
is to obtain a valid labor objective (Los Allgelcs P£c Ba.kers
Assn. v. Bakery Drirers, 122 Cal.App.2d 237, 238, 243 [264
P.2d 615] ; Schweizer v. Local Joint Board, supra; Local 24,
Internat'l Broth. Teamsters v. Oliver, 358 U.S. 283, 292-295
[79 S.Ct. 297, 3 L.Ed.2d 312] ). [17] As in the rent-fixing
clause considered in Local 24, 11lfernat'l Broth. Teamsters v.
Oliver, supra, the point of clause 13 is not priee-fixing, hut
wage-fixing, and the presence of employer-barbers in the union
does not convert the contract into an agreellH'nt bel\\'een labor
groups and nonlabor groups for the purpose of restraining
trade. (Cf. Alfred M. Lewis, /1Ir. v. WarrllOlIsc111cn ctc. Local
No. 542, 163 Cal.App.2d 771 [330 P.2d 53] ; Allen Bradley Co.
v. Local Union No.3, 325 U.S. 797 [65 S.Ct. 1533, 89 L.Ed.

1
I
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1939] ; G{boncy v. Empire St01'a[Jc Co., 336 U.S. 490 [69 S.Ct.
684,93 L.Ed. 834].)
The conclusion we rearh is not inconsistent with Overland
Pub. Co. v. H. S. Crocker Co., 193 Cal. 109 [222 P. 812].
In holding the agreement there involved between labor and
nonlabor groups a violation of the Cartwright Act, this court
said" [t]here is no question in our minds but that the primary purpose of this agreement was to create or carry out
restrictions in trade or commerce . . . . . "
(ld., at 115.)
There is not a shred of evidence in the record in the present
case to support a contention that such was the purpose of
elause 13.
Nor is our conclusion inconsistent with the general statement in Speegle v. Board of Fi,'e Underwriters, 29 Cal.2d 34,
44-45 [172 P.2d 867], that" [t]he public interest requires
free competition so that prices will not be dependent upon an
understanding among suppliers of any given commodity, but
upon the interplay of the economic forces of supply and demand. " That statement cannot be wrenched from its context
to condemn activity that the case did not eontemplate. In the
ar(>a of trade regulation the values of free competition themselves compete with the values of wage security. Clause 13
sought to secure certain wages as in any other union contract.
The difficulty of setting a fixed wage that is fair and reasonable in a trade consisting entirely of personal services is apparent. The union's method of setting the cost of its labor to
the employer in the barber's trade by reference to price is
appropriate in a service trade as it might not be in areas
where the worker's labor is not so predominantly linked with
costs.
Respondent does not contend that the contract, if entered
into between the union and an employer who does not work
with the tools of the trade and hence does not belong to the
union, is a violation of the common-law rule against pricefixing. He contends only that the union itself is a price-fixing
association because some employers belong to it who have
agreed among themselves to support minimum prices. As
noted earlier, however, tIle employer-barbers are required to
join the union only because they work in direct competition
with employee-barbers and could affect the wage s('ale adversely if they were not subjected to union responsibilities,
even if their individually established prire srales were above
tIle union scale. (See C. S. Smith Met. Market Co. v. Lyons,
16 Ca1.2d 389, 401 [106 P.2d 414].)

)
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[18] Plaintiff also contends that because employer-members are required to pay union dues and fees, defendant is
an employee group financed ill part by <>mployers in violation
of section 1122 of the Labor Code. That section provides:
" [a] ny person who organizes an employee group which is
financed in whole or in part, interfered with or dominated
or controlled by the employer or any employer association,
as well as such employer or employer association, shall be
liable to suit by any person who is injured thereby. Said
injured party shall recover the damages sustained by him
and the costs of suit." Section 1122 is part of the Jurisdictional Strike Act (Lab. Code, §§ 1115-1120, 1122) and its
plain purpose is to give an action for damages to any person
injured by the formation of a company union. Even were
defendant partly financed by the dues of employer-members,
their dues would not give them control over union power and
policy. Employers are prohibited from financing labor unions
because such financing might render a union less independent
and thus less able to represent its members effectively vis-a-vis
the employer. When, as here, the employer is himself a workman, his dues are no different from those of any other member.
Plaintiff's reliance on Journeymen Barbers, etc. Loeal Union
No. 205 v. Indush'ial Com., 128 Colo. 121, 131-]32 [260
P.2d 941], which reached a different result under a statute
making the employer's contribution of financial support to
a labor union an unfair labor practice (Colo. Rev. Stat.
80-5-6 (1) (b) ), is misplaced. That case relied exclusively upon
two earlier cases (Wisconsin Employ. ReT. BOQ1'd v. Journeymen Bm·be1's. 256 Wis. 77, 85-86 [39 N.W.2d 725]; DiLeo
v. Daneault, 329 Mass. 590, 595-597 [109 N.E.2rl 824]) that
have b('en superseded by subsequent legislation (Wis. Stat.
Ann. § 111.06 (I-b) (1957); Sf'C Wise01lsil1 Employ. Rel.
Board v. Journeymen Barbers, 272 Wis. 84, 89-90 [74 N.W.2d
815] ; Ann. Laws of Mass. ch. 150A, § 4(2) (1956»).
In view of our conclusion that the trial court's judgment
must be reversed, we need not consider defendants' contention that even if their picketing was dirf'ei('d toward an
improper purpose the trial court lacked power to issue an
injunction in the absence of proof that plaintiff had been
injured by their conduct.
The judgment is reversed.

)

Gibson, C. J., Peters, J., and White, J., concurred.
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SCHAUER, J., Dissenting.-The majority today present
the second installment of the ambitious project undertaken
by tl]em in Petri Cleaners, Inc., v. A.uto'Ynotive Employees, etc.,
Local No. 88 (1960), ante, p. 455 [2 Cal.Rptr. 470, 349
P.2d 76]. "The crucial issue in this case," say the majority
(ante, p. 877), "is whether a closed or union shop agreement
is a propcr objective of a labor union that does not reprcscnt
1l1J~' of the employees dir('C'tJy involved." This brief declaration appears, on further reading of the opinion, to be somewhat of an oversimplification of the problems involved.
A more revealing definition of the "crucial issue" would
be : Is picketing by an unwanted union whieh represents none,
or less tl1an a majority, of the employes in the picketed shop,
lawful when the objective of the picketing is to coerce the employer to himself join the union and in turn to coerce his
employes to join it'
Another "crucial issue," undefined by the majority but
actual1y disposed of by them, is: Shall this court refuse to
apply tlle Cartwright Act 1 to price-fixing agreements among
employers, and among employers and unions, in cases wherein
the otherwise illegal agreement is demanded by a labor union
in order to prevent the proprietors of either partially or exclusively self-owned and serviced barber shops from competing
on a price basis either among themselves or with any union
shops Y An ancillary question is: Shall this court, without
statutor~' authorization, differentiate between the types of
husiness activity in which it will give effect to the Cartwright
A('t T The holdings of the majority on these, and on even more
fundamental, issues and my reasons for disagreement are
hereinafter stated.
At the outset I wish to make it altogether clear that tllC
grounds on which I challenge the majority do not involve any
pro-labor or anti-labor factionalism. Chavez v. Sa.rgent (1959),
52 CIl1.2d 162 [339 P.2d 801]-whieh in this case as well as in
Petri is the principal target for the majority's attaek-was
not an anti-organized labor decision. It did not overrule a
:-;in;:de previous decision of this eourt. It did not strike down
or refuse to enforce any statute of California. A reading of
the majority opinion in the Chavez case will demonstrate that
'Stats. 190i, ch. 530, p. 984 et seq., amended Stats. 1909, ch. 362, p.
r,93 et seq.; lee also, for codification of statutes prost'ribing or regulating
('ontraC'ts in restraint of trade, Bus. & Prof. Code, ~ 16600 et seq., and
c'oml,inations in restraint of trade, Bus. & Prof~ Code, ~ 16iOO ct seC).

(Stats. 194], eh. u26, p. 1834 et seq.).
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it staunchly def('nds the statutory proscription of yellow dog
contracts, that it faithfully upholds the statutorily defined
rights of workmen to self-organization and to collectivc bargaining and to union security contracts; likewise it sustains
the use of labor's classic weapons-the strikc and peaceful
pickcting-for all lawful objectives. The quarrel with my
asso'ciates is on a more fundamental basis. It is on four basic
points:
1. The new majority have refused rcasonable respect for the
doctrine of stare decisis. (See Petri Cleaners, Inc. v. Automotive Employees, etc., Local No. 88 (1960), st/.pra, ante,
pp. 455, 475.)
2. They have refused to abide by the elementary principle
tllat reviewing courts will not find facts contrary to those
found by the trial court on substantially COllflicting evidence.
(See Petri dissent, ante, pp. 475,486-491, where the evidence
in that case relative to the issue of the Association of Pctri
employees as an independent or a eompanr union is carefully reviewed and shown to be sufficient to support the
trial court's implied findings. It may also be lloted that the
three justices of the District Court of Appeal who had previously reviewed the trial court's decision (1959, Cal.App.),
340 P.2d 731, as well as three justices of this court recognized
the substantiality and sufficiency of the evidence upon which
the trial judge acted.) 2
-Familiar rules for the guidance of a reviewing court in passing upon
the question whether the evidence supports tIle detennination of the trier
of fact that the situation presented to him does or does not constitute a
law·MfiuC'd opernth-e fact (e.g., in Petri, the c1l1plo~-cr '8 intcrfcren('e with
a union; in the next quoted opinion, an injury" arising out of and in the
course of employment") are stated in Cardillo v. Liberty M111ual 1M.
CO. (1947), 330 U.S. 469, 477·478 [6; S.Ct. 801, 806-807, 91 L.Ed.
1028], as follows: "In detcnnining [whctller the legally operative
ultimate fact exist.ed, the trier of fact] . . . must ne('e~sari1y draw an
inference from what he has found to be the basic facts. . . . If sup·
ported by evidence and not inconsistent with the law, the . . . inference
[of the operative fact by the finder] . . . is eonclush'e. No reyiewing
court can then set aside that inference because the opposite one is
thought to be more reasonable; nor ean the oppo~ite inf('r('ll('e bl:' suhst.i·
tuted by the court because of a belief that the one ehosen by the finder]
•.. is factually questionable. [Citations.]
"It matters not that the basic facts from which tIle [finder] •..
draws t.his inference are undisputed rather than controyerted. LCitation.]
It is likewise immaterial that the faets pcrmit tIle drawing of di-rcrse
inferences. The [trier of fact] •.. alone is charged with tIle dut.y of
initially selecting the inference which seems most reasonable and his
('hoice, if otberwise sustainable, may not be disturbed by a reYiewing
court. [Citation.] Moreover, the fact. tbat the inference . . . involves an
application of a broad statutory tenn or pbrase to a specific set of facts

r
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3. The new majority have refused to uphold and apply the
plain language of our basic labor relations statutes (Lab.
Code, § 923, and related sections, all quoted and upheld in
Chavez v. Sargent, supra, pp. 179-182, 186, 190, 201-203 of
52 Ca1.2d). Since section 923 is unambiguous, is not uneon·
stitutional, and has not been repealed, California is faced with
a peculiar conflict of laws: On one hand, the above cited
statute and implementing decisions; on the other hand, the
Petri case and today's decision. Such conflict, active or
potential, and productive of litigation, is likely to be a continuing one unless and until the majority yield to the statutes
or the latter are amended to conform to the views of the
majority.
4. In today's ease the majority refuse to apply the Cart.
wright Act. To reach the result announced they disregard,
without expressly disavowing, the principle declared by the
same author in Spcegle v. Board of F'i"e Underwriters (1946),
29 Ca1.2d 34, 44 (172 P.2d 867], that "The public interest
requires free competition so that prices be not dependent
upon an understanding among suppliers of any given com·
modity but upon the interplay of the economic forces of
supply and demand."
The actions of the majority in Petri as to points 1, 2 and 3
above enumerated, have been disturbing to me as a lawyer and
judge. Their action today, regrettably and regardless of the
fact, appears to lend further credence to the fears of eminent
('ol1llscl implicit in tIle following excerpt from their respect~
full~' and earnestly urged petition for reconsideration by this
court of its decision in Petri: "The overturning of Chavez
and Retail Clcrks by the present majority, within a few
months after those cases were decided, has created confusion
110t only within the legal profession but also in labor-manage·
ment relations and among the public generally. The disposition of those cases so soon after they were decided (less than
nine months] raises a serious question as to whether in California we are a government of men rather than of laws."
gives rise to no greater scope of judicial review. [Citations.] Even if
such an inference be considered more legal than factual in nature, the
reviewing court's function is exhausted when it becomes evident that the
I"finder's] .•• choice has substantial roots in the evidence and is not
forbidden by the law."
'I'he foregoing rules are normally recognized and followed by this court
as well as the high federal court. (Ham.ilton v. Pacific Bleo. By. Co.
(1939), 12 Cal.2d 598, 602 [5] [86 P.2d 829].)
.
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A comment in 47 Ca1.L.Rf'v. 905, 916, whil'h cOlH:erlled
Garmon, Chavez, and Rrtail Clerk>;' Union anu "'hich was
prepareu before the Petri deei>;ioll, predicted that "In a field
as ('ontroversial as labor relations, future devclopmcnts are
apt to be dependent on political fortunes and chan~cs in the
personnel of the courts"; less accurate was its predidion that
"It would seem, however, that at least the holdings of Chat·cz
and Retails Clerks' Union will stand."3
Further grave, constructive and merited criticism of the
action of the eourt in Petri appears in the brief of amici
curiae in support of respondent's request for a reconsideration of that decision: "The consequences of the dicta in the
Court's opinion as to Section 923 and Garmon are serious
and far-reaching. At a time when national policy banning
stranger picketing has been recently affirmed and strengthened,
the Court's opinion sets California's small enterprises on a
different path. The opinion condones what has c~'nically been
termed 'vertical organizing', and does so despite the plain
words of a plain statute. We believe that such a result should
not be reached at all, but particularly should not be reached
in a case wherein the issue is not squarely presented for
decision. "
Professor Bernard D. Meltzer of the University of Chicago
Law School has pertinently said (Recognition-Orgallizationa.l
"The fact that the Petri opinion was filed less than nine months after
Chavez brings to mind the protests of Mr. Justice Roberts in llfahnich v.
Sout/lcrn S. S. Co. (1944), 321 U.S. 96, 112·113 [64 S.Ct. 455, 88 L.Ed.
!i61]: "The evil resulting from overruling earlier considered d('cisions
must be evident. In the present ease, the court below naturnlly felt
bound to follow and apply the law as clearly announced by this court.
If litigants and lower federal courts are not to do so, the law becomes
not II chnrt to govern conduct but a game of chance; instead of settling
rights and liabilities it unsettles them. Counsel and parties will bring
and prosecute actions in the teeth of the decisions that Bueh actions are
not maintainable on the not improbable cllance that the asserted rule will
be thrown overboard. Defendants will not know whether to litignte or to
s('ttle for they will haye no assurance that a declared rule will be fol·
lowed. But the more deplorable consequence will inevitably be that the
Ildministration of justice will fall into disrepute." And again in Sm.it"
'T. Allwright (1944), 3~1 U.S. 649, 666, 669 [64 S.Ct. 757, 88 L.Ed. 987,
1.;1 A.L.R. 1110]: The "policy of the court freely to disregard and to
overrule considered decisions .•• indicates an intolerance for what those
wIlD have composed this court in the past have conscientiously om1 delib·
erately concluded, and involves an assumption that knowledge lind wisdom
reside in us which was denied to our predecessors. • . .
"The reason for my concern iB that the instant decision, overruling
that announced about nine years ago, tends to bring adjudications of this
tribunal into the same class as a restricted railroad ticket, good for this
day and train only."

)

Apr. 1960]

MESSNER t'. JOURNEYMEN BARBERS ETC.
IN'TERNATIONAL UNION

893

[53 C.2d 873: 4 Cal.Rptr. 179. 351 P.2d 3471

Pickefing ancl Right-fa-Work Laws (1958), 9 Labor Law

Journ. 55, 58), concerning the Taft-Hartley (pre-1959) Act,
"Although the statutory scheme involves a limitation on
the freedom of a dissenting minority, this limitation seems
justifiable on two grounds: First, it is necessary for orderly
collective bargaining, which has important values. Secondly,
the requirement that the bargaining agent have the support
of the uncoerced majority makes his authority consistent
with the generally accepted principles that the government
of political or private groups should depend on the consent
by a majority of those governed.
"There are those who would repudiate the requirement
of majority support on the ground that a union, at least if
it represents a substantial segment of an industry, is automatically entitled to the worker's allegiance and support. J
find this argument unacceptable for several reasons: First
it ignores the fact that the value of· collective bargaining both
to the enterprise and to the employees depends on consent,
by the employees affected, to the bargaining agent's role
and to the agreement he has negotiated. Majority support,
although it is not sufficient, is generally necessary, for SUdl
consent. For the purpose of determining the existence of
such support, the 'industry' is an abstraction far removed
from the employee's interest, which is generally eentered in
the plant or the enterprise which employs him. Accordingly,
the plant or the enterprise and not the industry appears in
general to be the largest unit which can be appropriately
used in determining whether the necessary majority support
exists. Secondly, the use of the smallest possible unit, eonsistent with orderly and stable collective bargaining, will
minimize the need for subordinating the preferences of larlXc
and concentrated minorities to the requirements of majority
rule. Minimizing the coercion of such minorities is still an
important value in our society, despite the expansion of institutional arrangements which promote the subordination of
the interests of individuals and minorities to those of larl!<'r
groups. For these reasons, I believe that tIle architects of the
federal policy were wise in rejecting the notion that unionR,
like the state, are entitled to any automatic allegiance. . . .
"It is, I believe, fair t.o assume that most unorganized
employers want to stay that way. Furthermore, the inherent
limitations of the law, as well a!'! bad administration, permit
some employers, by unlawful coercion, to deny to unions thc
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bargaining status which they would have otherwise aellicv('o.
But these considerations, troublesome as they are, 0.0 not
warrant the indiscriminate use of coercive picketing against
lawful as well as lawless employers and their employef>s."
The more specific reasons for my disagreement with the
holding of the majority that, consonant with California law,
an "outside" labor union can properly put economic pressure on an employer to compel him to execute a closed or
union shop agreement although none of his employes wish
to join or be represented by the union, are stated in the majority opinions in Garmon v. San Diego Bldg. Tmdes C01wcil
(1958), 49 Cal.2d 595 [320 P.2d 473] ; Chavez v. Sargcnt
(1959), supra, 52 Ca1.2d 162; and Retail Clerks' U11ion v.
Superior Court (1959), 52 Ca1.2d 222 [339 P.2d 839] ; and
the dissenting opinion in Petri Clconers, Inc. v. Automotivc
Employees, etc. Local No. BB (1960), supra, ante, pp. 455,
475. Section 923 of the Labor Code says that "the individual
workman . . . shall be free from the interference, restraint,
or coercion of employers of labor, or their agents, in the
designation of . . . [collective bargaining] representatives or
in self-organization . . ." The majority in Petri and in this
case, in effect, add to the quoted clear and explicit statutory
language an exception or proviso which, in my opinion, is
not only beyond the proper function of a court but which
does not promote the interests of either individual WOrkn1l'1l
or of organized labor. It seems to me that, when all or a
majority of the subject employes of a particular employ('r
choose not to join a union, the spirit and language of section
923 are as much violated if the employer coerces them to do
so because of the pressure of concerted union activity, such
as peaceful picketing, as the;\' would be if the employer acted
at the mere suggestion of a single representative of the union,
or upon his own initiativc.
Because of the above noted conflict between the statutory
law (Lab. Code, § 923, and related sections, as upheld and
applied in the rases last hereinabove cited) and the decisional
law declared in Petri and in this rase, it has appeared desirable to comprehensively research the pertinent statutes
and decisions of other jurisdirtions to ascertain which view
the weight of authority supports. The sources examined are
listrd in appropriately identifi('d footnotes and tIle ronrlusions reached are stated in th(' tpxt which follows.
The view that it is unlawful for union members to engage
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in peaceful but coercive picketing of the premises of an employer w}lOse employes do not wish to join the union, for
the purpose of compelling the employer to agree to, and in
his turn to then compel, a closed or union shop, is not, as
some of amici curiae supporting the defendant barbers' union
here suggest, a strange and shocking aberration. On the
contrary such is the view of most of the states today, and
the vie,~' of our national government to some as yet unclearly
defined extent (see N.L.R.B. v. Drivers U11ion Local 639
(1960), 362 U.S. 274 [80 8.0t. 706, 4 L.Ed.2d 710J
[28 Law Week 4217J ; National Labor :Management Relations
Act, as amended 1959, § 8 (b) (7» ; and in years recently past
state courts (when they were not precluded on the facts of
the particular case by federal preemption) often enjoined
such picketing.
In a number of states it has been held that provisions of
a state statute or constitution similar to section 923 of our
Labor Oode make the object of such picketing unlawfu1. 4
"Alabama: The following eases consider title 26. Code. ~ 383 (" Every
person shall be free to join or refrain from joining any labor organiza·
tion •.. and in the exercise of such freedom shall be free from interference") prior to Alabama's enactment of a "right-to-work" statute:
A closed or union shop was a lawful object of picketing where the picketing union represented a majority of the employes (Hotel 4" Restaurant
Employees v. Greenwood (1947). 249 Ala. 265 [30 So.2d 696, 703 [12],
70:) [17]]), but picketing for such object by a minority union could be
enjoined (Klibanoff v. Tri·Cities Retail Cl. Union (1953), 258 Ala. 479
[64 So.2d 393, 398]).
Colorado: Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Green (1948), 119 Colo. 92
[200 P.2d 924, 930-931], affirming injunction of picketing to compel an
employer to ent.er into an "all-union contract" after a majority of his
employes had voted against union representation; by executing such a
contract the employer would have committed the unfair labor practices
of interfering with employes' right to organize or remain unorganized
(§ 80-5-6(1) (a» and encouraging or discouraging membership in a labor
organization, except where the employer enters into an "all-union"
agreement as authorized by the provisions (§ 80-5-6(1)(c»
of the
compr('llcnsh-e Lahor Pell~e Act (Rev. Stats., ch. 80, art. 5, §§ 1-22,
enacted in 1943). See also Building Const. Tr. C01Lncil v. American
Bldrs_, Inc. (1959). - - Colo. - - [337 P.2d 953, 955-956].
Connecticut: Lat'ery's Main Street Grill v. Hotel 4" Restaurant Emp.
(1959), 146 Conn. 93 [147 A.2d 902, 905-906 [2-4)]; Kenmike Theatre
v. Moving Picture Operators (1952), 139 Conn. 95 [90 A.2d 881, 882883). Connecticut lIas a comprehensive Labor Relations Act (Gen. Stats.,
1949, H 7388-7399).
Idaho: Poffenroth v. Culinary Workel'S Union (1951), 71 Idaho 412
[232 P_2d 968, 969]; J. J. Newberry Co. v. Retail Clerks International
.du·n (1956), 78 Idaho 85 [298 P.2d 375, 379 [4]), reversed because of
federal preemption, 352 U.S. 987. The Idaho Code contains provisions
(§§ 44-701. 44-702) like sections 923 and 921 of our Labor Code. to-
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Some of these states mentioned in footnote 4 do and some do
not have more or less detailed labor relations aets and agencies
to administer them; in any event, the courts of such states
gether with other provisions like those of tile N orris·La Guardia Act
which were omitted from our code.
Indiana (prior to enactment of a "right· to-work" law): Roth v.
Local Union No. HOD (1939), 216 Ind. 363, 371 [24 N.E.2d 280, 282-283
[5, 6]], applying Acts 1933, ch. 12, § 2 (Burns' Ann. Stat., 1933, ~ 40502), a declaration of policy like section 9~3 of our Labor Code, in tlIe
In(liana anti-injunction act.
Kansas (prior to 1958 "riglIt-to-work" amendment to state Constitution): Bin.der v. Construction etc. Union (1957), 181 Kan. 799 [317
P.2d 371, 376·378 [2,4]], applying G.B. 1949, § 44-803 (like section 923
of our Labor Code, and also stating the right of employes "to refrain
from . . . such activities"), G.B. 1955, ~ 44-808 (employer coercion of
employes in tlIe exercise of their rights under section 44-803 unlawful),
G.S. 1955, § 44-809 (12) (such coercion of employes by "any person"
unlawful).
Kentucky: Blur Boar Cafeteria Co. v. Hotel 4- Re.~taurant Employees
etc. Union (19,32), - - K~·. - - 12;'4 S.W.2d 33;;' 338-339 [2]], eert.
den. 346 U.B. 834 [74 S.Ct. 41, 98 L.Ed. 3571: Hotel 4- Restaurant E'rnpZoyee8 etc. Union v. Lambert (1953), - - (Ky_App.) - - 258 S.W.2d
694 [1], applying KRS 336.130 (Acts Gen. Assembly, 1940, ch. 105),
which was rather like section 923 of our Labor Code.
Maine: Pappas v. Stacey (1955), 151 Me. 36 [116 A.2d 497, 499-501
[3]], appeal dismissed, 350 U.S. 870 [76 S.Ct. 117, 100 L_Ed. 770],
applying P.L. 1941, ch. 292 (R.B., cb. 30, § 15), like California Labor
Code, section 923.
Massachusetts: Ann. Laws, ch. 150A, is a comprehensive Labor Relations Act. The employer's compliance with a closed shop agreement
between the employer and one not certified as the representative of hiB
employes pursuant to the act would be an unfair labor practice and
picketing to enforce such compliance can be enjoined. (R. H. White Co.
v. Murphy (1942), 310 Mass. 510 [38 N.E.2d 685, 690 [9, 10], 691].)
Apart from t.he aet closed shop agreements voluntarily made have "always" been recognized and enforced. But a strike for a closed shop" is
for an unlawful labor objective" and peaceful picketing for sucII purpose can be enjoined. (Fashioncraft, Inc. v. Halpern (1943), 313 Mass.
385 [48 N.E.2d 1, 3-4, 5].)
Michigan: Way Baking Co. v. Teamsters 4' Tf'1Ick Drivers (1953),335
Mich. 478 [56 N.W.2d 357, 362 [4, 5]], cert. den. 345 U.S. 957 [73 S.Ct_
939, 97 L.Ed. 1378], applying Stats. Ann., ~ 17.454(18) (C.L. 1948,
§ 423.17, as amended by P.A. 1949, No. 230), the state Labor Relations
Act, which makes it unlawful for any person "by force or unlawful
threats to . . . attempt to force any person to become or remain a
member of a labor organization, or ..• to refrain from engaging in
employment.' ,
Minnesota: By StatB. Ann., ch. 179, as amended, a comprehensive
labor relations statute, it is an unfair labor practice for an employer
to sign a closed shop contract without the consent of his employes (Nemo
v. Local etc. Board (1949), 227 Minn. 263 [35 N.W.2d 337, 341]) and
apparently picketing to induce such practice could be enjoined (see
Starr v. Cooks etc. Union (1955),244 Minn. 558 [70 N.W_2d 873, 879]).
Missouri.: BelZerive Country Club. v. McVey (1955), 365 Mo. 477 [284
S.W.2d 492, 500 [2]] ["the right guaranteed to employees by Art. I,
Sec. 29, Mo. Const. 1945, 'to organize and to bargain collectively through

)
Apr. 1960]

MESSNER 1J. JOURNEYMEN BARBERS ETC.
IN'TERNATIONAL UNION

897

[53 C.2d 873; 4 Cal.Rptr. 179, 351 P.2d 347]

have concluded, they can and should provide a remedy against
the statutory or constitutional violation, whether such remedy
is the enforcement of a commission's cease and desist order
representatives of their own choosing' is a free choice, uncoerced by
management ••. "]; Swift I Company v. Doe (1958), - - Mo. - t3ll S.W.2d 15, 21 [3)].
~ew Jersey-: N.J. Const., 1947, art I, par. 19, provides, "Persons in
private employment shall have the right to organize and bargain collectively." This provision is not implemented by statute, but by the courts.
(Independent D.W. Union v. Milk Drivers etc. Local No. 680 (1959),30
X.J. 173 [1;;2 A.2d 331, 336 [2], 336-337 13,4]] [subject type of picketing by stranger union enjoined at suit of freely organized independent
union whicll had been selected as bargaining agent by employes at a
secret election conducted by a "Fair Ballot Association"; the court
rejects defendant union's contention that "the judiciary [should] be
inert because it cannot pro.ide a mechanism equal to the task of formulating and effectuating a fair pattern of labor-management relations"];
td. (1958), 49 N.J. Super. 78 [139 A.2d 134]; ro. (1956), 23 N.J. 85
112; A.2d 8li!l, 874-8;:") I::
8;5-876 [5,6] 1 r" }'reedom of choice in
selecting one's bargaining ng-mt is the very essence of collective bargain.
ing" and" [I)f the proted ion afforded to insure unfettered organizational processes by our Const itution is to have assistance . . ., the will
of the majority may not be undermined by picketing where the sole object
is economic duress upon the employer and the employees"].)
New York: Goodwill-s, Inc. Y. 1Iagcdorn (1951), 303 N.Y. SOO [101
N.E.2d 697, 3:! A.L.R.2tl 10l!I, 1021] [the Goodwins holding as to
federal preemption no douht could not stand today, but such holding is
not pertinent to our present consideration]; Wood v. O'Grady (1954),
307 N.Y. 532, 539-540 1122 N.E.2d 386]; Pleasant Valley Packing Co.
v. Talarico (1958),5 N.Y.2d 40 [152 N.E.2d 505, 507 [1)]. N. Y. Laws,
Ann., 1948, tit. 30, art. 20, ~ 700 et scq., is a comprehcnsi'l'e Labor Relations Act.
Pcnns~"lnllli:1: lFinan/; Y. Chester <1" Delau·arc etc. Union (1948), 360
Pa.48 r60 A.2d ~], ~3 r3. 41]; Sa?lsom House Enterprises v. Traiters etc.
Union (1955),382 Pa. 476 [115 A.2d 746, 749 [3]], cert. den., 350 U.S.
896 [76 S.Ct. 155, 100 L.Ed. 788]; School District v. Intcrnational Brother1100d (1958), 316 Pa. 408 [145 A.2d 258, 262]. Pa. Stats. Ann., tit.
43, 9 211.1-211.12, is a comprchensive Labor Relations Act.
Washington: Gazzam v. Building Service Employees Union (1948),29
Wash.2d 488 [188 P.2d 97, 104, 11 A.L.R.2d 1330), (19-19), 34 Wash.
2d 38 [207 P.2d 699], affirmed, Building Service Union v. GazzG'TI1
(1950), 339 U.S. 532, 538-539 [70 S.Ct. 784, 94 L.Ed. 1045], applying
an anti-injunction law like t.hat of Indiana, supra, and also stating that
stranger recognitional pickp.ting 'l'iolated "rules of common law"; Audubon Homcs Y. SpoJ.;ane B!dg. etc. Council (1956), 49 Wash.2d 145 [298
P.2d 1112, 1115 [1-3]], cert.. den., 354 U.S. 942 [77 s.et. 1392, 1 L.Ed.
2d 1536].
Wisconsin: r ogt, Inc. v. International Bj·othcr1100il of Teamsters
(1956), 270 Wis. 315 r74 N.W.2d 749, 753 [5], 755 [6]), affirmed,
Teamsters Union v. Vogt, Inc. (1957), 354 U.S. 284, 294 [77 S.Ct. 1166,
1 L.Ed.2d 1347]. Wisconsin's comprehensive Employment Peace Act
provides (Stat. Ann., 9111.06(2) (b») that it is an unfair labor practice
and against public policy for an employe individually or in concert with
others "To coerce •.• any employcr to interfere with any of his
employes in the enjoyment of their legal rights, ineluding those guaran-
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as spelled out by statute or, in the absence of statute, a
t~'pi('al ('xer(·ise of the POWl'!' or E'quity to enjoin against
threatened wrongful infiietiol1 of irl'rparable injury.
SOllle states haY(' statutes whi('h directly outlaw pi('keting
by a minority or strallger union, 5 and in a few states juditeed IJi section 111.04"; the latter section guarantees to employes the
right of self-organization, collective bargaining through representatives
of their own choosing, concerted lawful acth'ity, and the right to refrain
from t1lly such activities.
Wyoming: Hagen v. Culinary Workers Alliance Local No. SS'l (1952),
70 Wyo. 165 [246 P.2d 778, 788 [6]], applying tile Wyoming "Little
Norris-LaGuardia Act," W.C.S., § 5-1-501, like the Indiana and Washington statut('s, sllpra.
"Arizona (also lms a "right-to-work" law): Rev. Stat. Ann., ch. 8,
§ 23-1322: "It shall be unlawful for any labor organization to picket any
establishment unless there exists between the employer and the majority
of employees of such establishment a bona fide dispute regarding wages
or working conditions."
Colorado: Section 6(2) (e) of the Labor Peace Act (Rev. Stats., ch. 80,
art. 5, §§ 1-22) made a strike vote by a majority of the employes of the
subject employer a condition precedent of picketing, and section 7 (2)
provided that the strike vote be taken" as is provided in this act." These
sections were held inoperative because the only provision in "this act"
for a strike vote was in section 20, which in turn was held unconstitutional because it required incorporation of unions. (A1llerican Federation
of Labor v. R('illy (1944), 113 Colo. 90 [155 P.2d 145, 150 [9, 10], 160
A.L.R. 873].)
Hawaii: Rev. Laws, 1955, ch. 90, is a comprehensive Employment
Relations Act. Section 90-8(e) provides that it is an unfair labor practice for an employe "To cooperate in engaging in, promoting or inducing
picketing (not constituting an exercise of constitutionally guaranteed
freedom of speech) •.. unless a majority in a collective bargaining unit
of t he eDlplo~-ees of an employer against whom such acts are primarily
direeted have voted by secret ballot to call a strike."
Minnesota: Stat. Ann., ~ 179.11 (4) provides that it is an uufair labor
practice "For any person to picket or cause to be picketed a place of
employment of which place the person is not an employee while a strike
is in progress affecting the place of employment, unless the majority of
persons engaged in picketing the place of employment at these times are
employees of the place of employment."
lIIontana has a rather unusual statute (Rev. Code Ann., § 41-1801;
L. 1959, cll. }(iO, § 1) which provides that" a sole proprietor or a member
of a partnership consisting of not more than two partners who own a
retail or amusement establishment and the members of his immediate
family shull 113ve the right to do any work in his place of business without interference by any union or any member thereof."
Oregon: Rey. Stats., 1953, ch. 662, §~ .610 through .790, a comprehensh'e labor code, specifically provides (§ .750) that "It shall be unlawful
for any person directly or indirectly to . . . coerce . . . any employee
in tile exercise of said employee '8 free choice in selecting or rejecting a
labor organization as the representative of employees for the p~rpose of
collective bargaining, or . . . to coerce . . . any employer or employee
because employees of said employer . . . h(1\'e not selected a labor organization as their representative for said purpose_ The word 'coeree' includes picketing." The constitutionality of this provision was upheld in
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cially declared public policy forbids recognitional picketing
by such a union. 6 In the many states which have made the
union shop illegal by "right-to-work" statutes,7 picketing to
compel exeeution of a union shop contract is of course for
an unlawful object. The states which uphold the legality of
Gilbertson v. Culinary Alliance 4' Bartenders' Union (1955), 204 Ore.
326 [282 P.2,1 632, 6;;2·653 [15·18]].
Pennsyi\"ania: The state Labor Relations Act (Act of 1947, No. 484)
pro\"ided tha~ it is a union unfair labor practice for a labor organization
or employ<'s •• To picket or cause to be picketed a place of employment
1,y a perRoll . . . who is not • • • an employee . • • of the plaee of
employment."
(Purdon's Stats. Ann., tit. 43, ~ 211.6(2) (d).) This
Rtatule \";:1' h~ld :m ull('onstitl1tionnl restraint on freedom of speech because its brond prohibition of picketing by nonemployes "leaves room
for no exceptions based upon the lawfulness of the purpose of the pieketing, its peaceful character, or the circumstances tbat tbe picketers have
a legitimate economic interest to advance thereby." (Pennsylvania
I,abor Relations Board v. Chester 6" Dc!_ etc. Union (1949),361 Pa.246
[64 A.2d S3~. 841 [3]].)
Tex:ls (whiell has a "rigbt-to-work" law) also sought to narrowly
restrict l'eac·eful picketing by the following provisions of Vernon's Ann.
Ch·. Stat., art. 1>154f: "It shall be unlawful for any person •.• to •.•
lmrticipatc in, aid or abet . • . sccondary picketing ••• as those terms
are defined herein"; i.e., "the act of establishing a picket . . • near the
premises of any employer where no labor llispute, as that term is defined
in this Act, exi~ts between such employer and his employees..•• The
term 'lnhor dispute' is limit.ed to . . . any controversy between an employer and the majority of his employees concerning wages, hours or
conditions of employment; provided that if any of the employees are
mem!'ers of n labor union, a controversy between such employer and a
lIlajority of til" employees belonging to such union, concerning wages,
hours or conuitions of employment, shall be deemed, as to the employee
members onl~' of snell union, a labor dispute within the meaning of this
Ailt." In Illtenlatienal Union of Operating Engineers v. Cox (1949),
148 Tex. 42 r~]!J S.W.:!d 787,793 [10-12]], it was held that the foregoing stat.utory definitions were so narrow as to constitute an unconstitutional depriyation of free speedl, but the right to impose reasonable
r~stri('tiolls 011 pcaceful picketing was recognized.
Wis('on"in: Stat. Ann., § 111.06(2) (e), like the Hawaii statute, supra.
·X~\\' Hnmpshire (semble): White Mt. F"cezer Co. v. Murphy (1917),
78 N.H. 311S [101 A. 3;;7, 361 [12], 362 [13]].
Illinois: Bit2'cr JTofor Co. v. Loral 604 (1953),349 Ill.App. ·283 [110
N.E.!!d 6;4, 6i7 [4]].
Ohio: Clul<'alcR Y. Royalty (1956),164 Ohio St. 214 [129 N.E.2d 823,
S28 [4]], errt den., 3;;] U.S. 926 [76 S.Ct. 781, 100 L.Ed. 1456].
Wn~hjllgtoll:

Ga::::am

Y.

Bllilding Service Employees Union (1948),

2!J W:\~h.2d 48S 11SS P.2d 97, 104], holds that stranger recognitionol pirhting "iolated tllC "rommon law" as well as the statute reo
ferred to ill footnotc 4, III/pra.
'Alnh:tmo: Title :;(1, ('ode, ~ 375(2), (3); see A/abanla HighlJ'ay ExP'·CS•• , Inc. Y. I.oral 61::! (]!);i9) , 26R Ala. 392 [108 So.2d 350, 356].
Arizona: 11146 amendment to Ariz. Const. (implemented by Ariz.
Session Lnws, l!lH. cll. 81, p. 173); upheld in American Federation of
Labor Y. Aml/'jcan So.,71 4' Dool' Co. (11l48), 67 Ariz. 20 L189 P.2d 912],
/II/pTa,
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recognitional picketing to compel an employer to force a union
shop upon an unwilling majority of his employes are few. s
In situations preempted to the jurisdiction of the National
affirmed, American Federation 01 Labor v. American Bash Co. (1949),
335 U.S. 538 [69 S.Ct. 258, 93 L.Ed. 222, 6 A.L.R.2d 481].
Arkansas: Ark. Const., Amendment 34; Acts of Ark., 1947, Act No.
101; Bellv. Taylor (1950),217 Ark. 953 [235 S.W.2d 45, 49 [2]].
Florida: Fla. Const. Dec!. of Rights, § 12, as amended, 1944; Local
No. f34, etc. v. Henley 4" Beckwith, Inc. (1953, :I!'la.), 66 So.2d 818, 820.
Georgia: Laws, 1947, No. 140 (Code Ann. 54-804, 66-9906); Power.
v. Courson (1957), 213 Ga. 20 [96 S.E.2d 577].
Indiana: Acts 1957, ch. 19 (Bums' Ann. Stats. (1957 Supp) , § 40·
2701 et seq.); see Smith v. General Motors Corp. (1957), 128 Ind.App.
310 [143 N.E.2d 441, 449 [7]].
Iowa: Laws, 1947, ch. 296 (Code Ann., § 736A.1 et seq.).
Kansas: Kan. Const., art. 15, § 12 (adopted 1958).
Louisiana: The general "right·to-work" law (LSA·R.S. 23: 88123:888; see Piegts v. Amalgamated Meat Cutters (1955), 228 La. 131
[81 So.2d 835, 838 [1, 2]]) was repealed by Laws 1956, Act 16. Laws
1956, Act 397, is a "right-to-work" law for agricultural workers.
Mississippi: Code Ann., § 6984.5 (Laws, 1954, ch. 249, §§ 1, 2).
Nebraska: Neb. Const., art. XV, §§ 13, 14, 15, adopted in 1946, upheld
in Lincoln Federal Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron 4" Metal Co.
(1948), 149 Neb. 507 [31 N.W.2d 477], affirmed, Lincoln Union v.
Northwestern Co. (1949), 335 U.S. 525 [69 S.Ct. 251, 93 L.Ed. 212, 6
A.L.R.2d 473].
Nevada: Stats. 1953, eh. 1; Building Trades Council v. Bonito (1955),
71 Nev. 84 [280 P.2d 295, 297 [3]).
North Carolina: N.C. Session Laws, 1947, ch. 328, upheld in State v.
Whitaker (1947),228 N.C. 352 [45 S.E.2d 860], affirmed, Lincoln Union
v. Northwestern Co. and Whitaker v. North Carolina (1949), 335 U.S.
525 [69 S.Ct. 251, 93 L.Ed. 212, 6 A.L.R.2d 473].
North Dakota: NDRC, 1949 Supp., § 34-0901; NDRC, 1953 Supp.,
§ 34-0114; Minor v. Bldg. and Constr. Trades Council (1956), - - N.D.
[75 N.W.2d 139, 149 [12]].
South Carolina: Code, §§ 40-46 tllrough 40-46.11 (enaeted 1954).
South Dakota: Const., art. VI, § 2, as amended 1946; Laws, 1947, ch.
92, ~§ 1·3; Baumgartner's Electric Const. Co. v. DeVries (1958), - S.D. [91 N.W.2d 663, 672·673 [9]).
Tennessee: Public Acts, 1947, eh. 36 (T.C.A. § 50-209); Finchum Steel
Erection Corp. v. Local Union 884 (1957), 202 Tenn. 580 [308 S.W.2d
381]; Farnsworth 4" Chambers Co. v. Local Union 429 (1957),201 Tenn.
329 [299 S.W.2d 8, 11 [9]], reversed because of federal preemption, 353
U.S. 969 [77 S.Ct. 1051, 1 L.Ed.2d 916].
Texas: Laws 1947, eh. 74 (Vernon's Ann. Civ. St., art. 5207a);
Local Union No. 324 v. Upshur-Bural Elec. Co-op Corp. (1933, Tex.Civ.
App.) 261 S.W.2d 484, 485 [3].
Utah: Code Ann. §§ 34·16-1 through 34-16-18 (Laws 1955, ch. 54).
Virginia: Acts of Assembly, 1947, ch. 2, upheld in Plu'l1lbers Union v.
Graham (1953), 345 U.S. 192, 200-201 [73 S.Ct. 585, 97 L.Ed. 946].
"New Mexico: Romero v. Journeymen Barbers (1938), 63 N.M. 443
[321 P.2d 628, 629], upholds such picketing as a court· declared rule.
Rhode Island: The comprehensive state Labor Relations Act, Gen.
Laws, tit. 28, ch. 7 (P. L. 1941, eh. 1066) resembles the Wagner Act
(pre-Taft-Hartley). Section 28·7·2 thereof declares the public policy
of self-organization and collective bargaining of employes through repre-

Apr. Ht60]

MESSNER 1'. JOURNEYMEl\ DARBERS ETC.
IN'TERNATlONAL UNlON
[53 C.2d 873: 4

Cal.~Dtr.

901

179, 351 P.2d 347J

Labor Relations Board and the federal courts under the TaftHartlpy Act,9 however, N.L.R.B. v. Drivers Union Local 639

,

)

)

Acntatives of their own choosing "free from the interfN('llce, restraint
or coercion of their employers" (~1) and provides that the nct shall not
be construed to diminish the right of employes to engage in "lawful,
('oncerted Ilctivities." According to Lindsey Tavern v. Hotel 4' Restau·
rant Employee,q (1956), 85 R.I. 61 [125 A.2d 207, 209, 210 [4]],
reeognitional picketing, "unaccompanied by coercion, duress or intimi·
dation, is lawful, . . . even if the picketing union represents no em·
ployees of the complainant."
West Virginia: Blossom Dairy Co. v. Internatio'llal Brotherhood
(1942),125 W.Va. 165 [23 S.E.2d 645,649], where no statute is involved,
holds (Syllabus 1 by thc court, p. 646 of 23 S.E.2d) that "Picketing of
the l)lace of business of an employer by a labor union will not be en·,
joined on the ground that it tends, or is intended, to cause the breach of
a labor contract between such employer and another lahor organization,
when such picketing is not otherwise unlawful."
Nevada (prior to enaetment in 1953 of a "right·to,work" law) may
also be mentioned here: State ex reI. Culinary v. Eighth Judicial District
Court (1949),66 Nev. 166 [207 P.2d 990, 996·998 [10·12]], upheld the
legality of picketing by an outside union to compel a closed shop agree·
ment under N.C.L., § 10473 (enacted 1911), which provided that "It
shall be unlawful for any person •.• to make .•• any agreement •••
by the terms of which any employee of such person, . . . or any person
about to enter the employ of such person, . . . as a condition for continuing or obtaining such employment, shall promise or agree not to become
or continue •••, or .•• to become or continue a member of a labor
organization," and N.C.L., § 2825.31 (approved 1937), a statutory
declaration of policy substantially, identical with section 923 of our
Labor Code_
'Prior to its 1959 amendment section 8 of t.he Labor Management
Relations Act of 1947, as amended (29 U.S.C. § 158), contained among
the proscribed unfair labor practices (largely the same as those which,
prior to the recent majority decision in the Petri Cleaners ease were
proscribed in California by Labor Code, see.tion 923, and related sections)
the following which are here pertinent:
"(b) It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or
its agents:
"(1) to restrain or coerce (A) employees in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed in section 7 [i.e., rights to self-organization, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, etc., and also to
refrain from such activities except as the latter right may be affeeted by
a union security agreement as authorized in section 8(a)(3)] •••
"(2) to cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against
an employee in violation of subsection (a) (3) [which provides that it is
an unfair labor practice for an employer to discriminate in regard to
employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organ·
ization, except that the employer call enter into a union security agreement as authorized by the act] . . .
"(4) to engage in, or to induce or encourage the employees of any
employer to engage in, a strike or a concerted refusal in the course of
their employment to . _ • work on any .• _ commodities or to perform
any services, where an object thereof is: ••. (C) forcing ..• any
employer to recognize or bargain with a particular labor organization as
the representath-e of his employees if another labor organization has
been certified • . ."
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(1960), supra, 362 U.S. 274 [80 S.Ct. 706, 4 L.Ed. 2d
710] [28 Law Week 4217], has answered negatively the
questioJl "wlldhcl' prareful pic:kt'ting by a union, whieh does
not l'epl'esrnt a majority of the employees, to compel immediate recognition as the employees' t·xtlusiye barg-aining agrlJt,
is conduct of the union 'to restrain or coeree' thr employres ill
the exercise of rights guaranteed in § 7, and thus an unfair
labor practice under § 8(b) (1) (A)." The board there issuf'd
a cease and desist order against picketing which continued
for six months after the employes of Curtis Bros. voted in
favor of "no union." The board prorerded under section
8(b) (1) (A) prior to the 1959 amendment of Taft·Hartley,
and although on oral argument to the United States Supreme
Court counsel for the board stated that, had the case arisen
uncler the 1959 act, the board might haye prorreded under
section 8(b) (7) thereof,lO the majority refused to remand
the matter for reconsidrration in the light of the new law.
The court rrachrs its conclusion in the following manner:
"[P. 4219 of 28 Law 'Veek.] [T]ension exists brtwerll the
two rights of employres protected by § 7-their right to form,
join or assist labor organizations, and their right to refrain
from doing so . . . . The Board stated: 'Because the object
of the Union's piel;:eting in this case was to force the Company to commit an art prohibited by the statute itself [that
is, to recognize and contract with the Loral although it was
not the chosen representatiYc of a majority of the Curtis
Bros. employees] and directly to dcpriye the employees of
a right expressly guaranteed to them by the same Act, there
is no occasion here to balance rOllfiicting interests or rights.' "

')

1°The 1959 act adds a new union unfair labor practice to section B(b) ;
i.e., "(7) to picket or cause to be picketed .•. any employer where an
object thereof is forcing or requiring an employer to recognize or bar·
gain with a labor organization as the repr!'s!'ntative of his employees ..•
unless Buch labor organization is currcntly cl'Ttifi!'d as the representative
of Buch employees: I I
(A) where the employer has lawfully recognized anotJI(.'T union and a
question concerning representation may not appropriately be raised
under tl,e act.
(B) where a valid representation clection 1188 been conducted in the
preceding 12 months.
(0) where the picketing has been conduded without a representation
petition being filed with the board "within a reasonable })eriod of time
110t to exceed thirty days from the eommemem!'nt of sueh picketing, I I
with some pro,isos.
"Nothing in this paragraph (7) al,aJl be ronstrued to pennit any act
which would otherwise be an unfair labor practice under this section
, (8) (b)."

)
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The board's conclusion, as su.mmarized by the court, was
that "the threat to the employees' job seeurit~· whieh was
thought to be inherent in the economic pressure directed
against the employer . . . was said to taint peaceful picketing"
as unlawful conduct to 'restrain or coerce' which the Board
might forbid."
The high court's opinion continues as follows: "We first
consider § 8 (b) (1) (A) in the light of § 13 whic·h provides,
in substance, that the Taft-Hartley Act shall not be taken
as restricting or expanding either the right to strike or the
limitations or qualifications on that right, as these were undprstood prior to 1947, unless 'specifically provided for' in thc
Act itself.(11l . . . [Before 1947] the full protection of the
Norris-La Guardia Act extended to peaceful picketing by
minority unions for recognition. [Citations.] Therefore, since
the Board's order . . . would obviously •impede' the right
to strike it can only be sustained if such power is 'specifically provided for' in the Taft-Hartley Act, that is, in
§ 8(b) (1) (A)."
That section does not vest such power in the board. (P.
4220 of 28 Law Week.) The "general standard" of section
8(b) (1) (A) does not overlap the "rather specific" prohibitions of section 8 (b) (4) . (See particularly § 8 (b) (4) (C),
quoted supra, footnote 9.) The words "restrain or coerce"
in section 8(b) (1) constitute "a 'restricted phrase' to be
equated with 'threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit,' " as contrasted with the words "induce or encourage"
in section 8 (b) (4). And the legislative history of section
8 (b) (1) (A) as read by the high federal court does not support
t]lC board's view.
Finally, the court says (p. 4222 of 28 Law Week), "We
are confirmed in our view by the action of Congress in passing
the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959.
That Act goes beyond the Taft-Hartley Act to legislate a
comprehensive code governing organizational strikes and
picketing and draws no distinction between 'organizational'
and 'recognitional' picketing. . . . Were § S(b) (1) (A) to
,,[11 1Section

i

13 provides:
" 'Nothing in this Act, except as speeifical1y proyided for }Ierein, shall
be construed so as either to interfere with or impede or diminish in any
way the right to strike, or to affect the limitations or qualifications on
that right.' 61 Stat. 151, 29 U.S.C. ~ 163.
"Picketing has been equated with striking for the purposes of § 13.
[CitatiOJlll.] "
.

)
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have the sweep contended for by the Board, the Board might
proceed against peaceful picketing in disregard of [the safeguards of § 8(b) (7) of the 1959 act, quoted supra, footnotc
10] . . . . Courts may properly take into account the later
Act when a.<;ked to extend the reach of the earlier Act's vague
language to the limits which, read literally, the words might
permit."
For the following reasons I cannot regard the foregoing
decision as persuasive in its effect on the problem of state
law which is under discussion: To me, as to three justices
of the federal Supreme Court (p. 4223 of 28 Law Week),
section 8(b) (7) of the 1959 federal act "seems squarely to
cover the type of conduct involved," and that matter has
not been fully and fairly litigated. In any event, it is a
generally accepted view that Congress by the 1959 amendments sought to curtail minority or stranger picketing for
the purpose of causing organization "from the top." (See
John H. Fanning, member of the NLRB, The New TaftHartley Arnendme11ts (1959), 10 Labor Law Journ. 763, 765;
HnrTY H. Rains, New York attorney, What the New Labor
Law Means to Management (1959), 10 Labor Law Journ. 753,
790-793; Benjamin Wyle, formerly general counsel of the
Textile Workers' Union, now member of the Labor Arbitration Committee of the American Bar Association, The New
Law of Picketing (1959), 10 Labor Law Journ. 889, '891,
894.) Nor am I able to predict what view the high court
might take had the picketing in the above case been recognitionally but not organizationally effective and caused Curtis
Bros. to violate section 8(a) (3) of the national act. Also I
would note that the emphasis placed by the lIigh court upon
the protection afforded the subject picketing by the NorrisLa Guardia Act prior to 1947 is not pertinent in California,
for in 1933 our Legislature refused to pass an anti-injunction
bill similar to that act, and instead adopted only its declaration of policy (Lab. Code, § 923) and its provisions against
yellow dog and company union activity of the employer.
Therefore, I reiterate my opinion that the majority's concept of "freedom" of self-organization "is definitely opposed
not only to the statutes of California but also to widely expressed recent thinking in the field of labor-managementindividual workman relations" (Petri dissent, ante, p. 480).
Giving efreet to the plain language of Labor Code, section
923 and related sections, upholding and applying them as was
.

)
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done in California prior to the Petri decision, California law
was in harmony with that of the vast majority of the sister
states (footnotes 4 through 8, supra) and with wllat at least
seems to be the clear purport of sections 8(b) (7) (B) and
8(b) (7) (C) of the federal act. In my rcsearch I have dis('on'red only three other states (footnote 8, supra) which
definitely accept the view enunciated by the majority in Petri
and reiterated today. The California statutes are, of course,
still in our law books, and thcir clear language is still in harmony with the state law of the majority of states and with
the most recent statutory developments of the federal law.
Nevertheless, by the decree of four justices who refuse to up)lOld and apply that \vhich was the established statutory and
decisional law of this state, California in intrastate matters
is currently retrograded to that small minority of states whic·h
persist in maintaining an ungoverned area in labor relations.
Thus ill California large enterprises which are engaged in
interstate commerce have at least some measure of protection
under federal law while small businesses, despite our statutory
law, are left to "the free [and destructive] interaction of economic forces" (Petri Cleaners, Inc. v. Auiomot-ive Employ('rs,
etc., Local No. 88 (1960), supra, ante, pp. 469, 473) which
is more similar to the combat of tooth and nail than to the
operation of a governed society.
The broad sweep of thc majority's holdings in Petri and in
the case at bench-going far beyond the import of the succinet
statement of "crucial issue" hereinabove quoted- requires
from me some comment upon problems of application of California antitrust law to union price-fixing activities. Such
comment appears appropriate becanse of the manner in which
the majority (pp. 885-887, ante'") treat plaintiff's contention that defendant Local 256 "is not only a labor organization but also a priee fixing organization of employers," a
combination unlawful under the Cartwright Act (Bus. &
Prof. Code, § 16700 ct s<'q.) and the common law of this state
(Speegle v. Board of Fi,'C Underwriters (1946), Sllpm. 2!l
Ca1.2d 34, 44 [11]). Ql1<'stions whether defendant was 01'
was not engaged in i]]<'l!:al )'<'straint of compctition and prieefixing, or in an attempt to compel plaintiff to agree to sueh
liThe essence of the mnjority's holding (pp. 886-887, ante) is thnt
"tIle point of clause thirteen fof the demnnded eontraet] ill not pricefixing, but wngc-1ixing, and the presence of employer-barbers in the union
does not convert the contract into an agreement between labor groups
and non-labor groups for the purpose of restraining trade."

)
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restraint, were not raised by the pleadings or mentionrd in the
pretrial on1cr or at the trial and, since they were not presented to the trial court, its findings of fact and <.'one1nsions
of 1m\" are not directed to them.
IIoweYer, the question of the legality of the <.'011tra<'1 ,yJlich
was the object of defendants' economic pressure-like the
question of the legality of a contract which a plaintiff seeks
to enforce or for breach of which he seeks dama!!es (Morcy v.
Paladini (1922), 187 Cal. 727, 733·734 [2] [203 P. 7601)('an be raised at any stage of the proceeding, and ""'When
the court discovers a fact which indicates that the contract is
illegal and ought 110t to be enforced [or, here, its exeeution
('ompelled], it will, of its O1yn motion, instigate an inquiry in
relation thereto" (id., p. 734 [3] of 187 Cal.).
In the present case the evidence showed and the trial conrt
found that defendant Loeal 256 "is a labor organization
whose membership includes .... barbers employed b~r proprietors of barbershops" and also "barbers who are not employers, induding operators of bar1.)('r shops who cmplo~T other
barbers and a very large numbrr of proprietors of barber
shops"; that defendants "were and are seeking to extend the
membership of the Defendant Union to all barbers working
with the tools of the trade within the trrritorial jurisdiction
of the Defendant Pnion whether emplo:vers or journeymen
barbers"; and that the printed for111 of contract which defendants drmanc1rd of plaintiff statrs, "13. "Whereas wnges nre
paid on a pererntage basis tIle prices to be charged under this
.\!!reement in nll Union barber shops not to be less than the
following: [listing prices]."
Then' is no finding that the praceful picketing of plaintiff
hy I .. oca1. 256 was part of an effort b~' suell union to influee all
('mplo~-('rs of barbrrs nnd self-employed harb('rs in the Snn
Di('go area to agree to the seale of minimum priers ,yhidl,
according to clause] 3 of the form of agreement present('d to
plaintiff. nrc "to br (·llllrg;:t1 under this Agreement in all
Fnion ba1'1)(,1" shop..;:." But the constitution of tIl(> JonrneyJl1(,1l £:11'hers. IIainll'rssel's, Cosmetologists and ProJlrietors'
1ntcl'll:1tiona1 rllioll of AllW)'ica, ,yhi('h if; in eyidC'll(Or. shows
that pril·e-fixing is the l11ethor1 of wage-fixing nSl'd by the
ol'g'anizatioll. 13 In these eirCUlJl:oi\;l1W(,s the quC'stion of re13Among the provisions of the International '8 constitution nre the
following:
.Article III, section 1: "Thc General Executivc Bonrd of the Interna..

)
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straint of trade is before us, and I am impelled to state the
reasons why I cannot join in implications in the majority
opinion that the attainment by the local union of a price-fixing
agreement with each cmp]o~'er in the San Diego area would be
a proper union objectiyc hecause as to each employer the
union would be "acting alone" (ante, p. 886) to fix minimum wages, not minimum prices.
If the operator of every barber shop in the territorial jurisdiction of Local 256 were to enter into an agreement with
Local 256 to conform to the minimum price scale set by the
union then (whether the price scale was agreed to at the request of the operator, the behest of the union, or as a product
of col1ective bargaining) prices would he just as fixed as if
the operators, in their eapacities as businessmen, had agreed
with one another to fix them. To my mind the illegality and
undesirability of such a situation could not be removed by
saying that no barber shop operator acting as a busincssman
combined with any other barber shop operator so acting, or
that the control of prices was brought about by a labor union
which acted for the purpose of fixing wages, and therefore
should bc deemed beyond the reach of the law. "The law respects form less than substance." (Civ. Code, § 3528.)
The "point" of a union's obtaining from businessmen an
agreement such as clause 13 of the form of contraet here
sought, is that the union had adopted price-fixing as a means
of wage-fixing. Such pricc-fixing is morc than a mere incitional Union is authorized to grant charters to local unions or employers'
guilds . . .
"Sec. 3. In places where more than onc union llOlds a charter, said
unions and guilds shall form a joint committee to regulate prices, wages,
hours of lahor and otller working conditions. . . . "
Article "II, section 6: "No Shop recognized as a union shop . . .
l111all pl'rmit the following unfair trade practices: .•. 4. The rendering
of any seryiee in the trade area thereof for less than thc minimum prices
('sta blishI'd in said trade area . . .
"Scc. 11 . . . . Copies of thc working agreement setting forth prices,
wages and hours and othl'r working conditions slwll be signed by the
owner or operator signing the Shop Card agreement . . .
"Sec. 12. The contract, or agreement, called for by these laws shall he
M construed that the person . . . displaying the Shop ('ard shall speci1i~ally agree: . . . (b) To ahide hy the laws of the local union . . .
with referencc to prices, hours, wages, an(1 working conc1itions . . . . "
Artide XV, section 1. "Every local union or guild may make its own
by-laws, \yllich must, howcyer, bc in arcOI-dance with this Constitution . . . .
"Sec. ii. Eyery local union shall regulate the hours of lahor, prices
and wages in their Tl'sl'cctiyc locality
"

)
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dent reasonably related to the proper union obje~tive of
securing a wage scale;14 it is the very heart of the wage-fixing
method chosen by the union. The line which unions cannot
pass in restraining trade may sometimes be obscure but in
such a situation, I think, thc ullion would clearly haye gone
beyond that line. (Dc Ncri v. Gene Louis, Inc. (1941), 261
App.Div. 920 [25 N.Y.S.2d 463], affirming (1940), 174 Misc.
1000 [21 N.Y.S.2d 993, 995], modified on other grounds,
(1942), 288 N.Y. 592 [42 N.E.2d 602]; Rcinman y. Jaffe
(1952), 280 App.Div. 837 [113 N.Y.S.2d 716, 717 [2, 3]] ;
Commonwealth v. ~lIIcHlIgh (1950),326 Mass. 249 [93 N.E.2d
751, 760 [8, 9]] ; Robison v. Hotel ((; Restall7"ant Employees
(1922), 35 Idaho 439 [207 P. 132, 136] [where" [t]he purpose of [concerted union activity] was, not to fix the price, or
regulate the production of auy article of trade or commerce,
but to better their own economic condition"].)
As this court, speaking through Mr. Justice Traynor,
unanimously recognized in Speegle v. B001-d of Fire Underwrite1's (1946), supra, 29 Ca1.2d 34, 44, 45, "The public interest requires free competition so that prices be not dependent upon an understanding among suppliers of any given
commodity, but upon the interplay of the economic forces of
supply and demand," and "[ C] ombinations between employers and employees present a particularly effective means of
stifling competition." Despite the dissimilarity between occupations of the persons in the Speegle case and those in this
case, the foregoing statements of facts of ('conomic life arc
true here if they were true therc. .And even if, as stated by
the majority in the Petri Cleaners case (ante, p. 469),
"An employer's decision wh('ther or not to bargain with a
labor organization has long be(,n determined in tbi!'> state by
the free interaction of economic forces," there are in the
opinion of the same majority toda~' strong implications that
the price of haircuts is 110t to be so determined.
And if a union can fix minimum prices of a service commodity as a means of fixing" minimum wages. then why should
"Pcrtinent here is the view taken hy the NLRB in mal;illg a cease
and desist order as to conduct whirh it determined W~ s n Tnft·Hartleydpfined unfair lahor practice, and 1\,· the United States Supreme Court
in upholding the hoard's determination, in Xalional Labor Relalions
Board Y. ])r1!VCT Bldg. 4' COI1St. l'rar/cs Council (J9:il), 341 U.S. 675,
688, 6S!) 71 S.Ct. !143, 93 L.B,]. 1:':81]. The hO:1 r,1 foun,1 "That an
ohject, if not the only ohject, of whnt trnnspircd" was tIle proscribed
unfair lahor practice; the high court accepted this finding :111<1 held that
"It is not neccssnry to find that the sole object of the strike was thnt
[proscribed by the national act]."

r
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it not fix maximum prices so as to prevent employers from
pricing themselves out of the market, decreasing the number
of their customers, and thus being compelled to reduce the
number of their employes? Or if a union of workers who
furnish a service commodity can fix minimum prices of such
commodity so as to establish a wage based on a pcrcentage of
the price· of the service produced by the worker, why should
not a union of workers who make objects of trade adopt a
similar method of fixing wages by fixing the price at which
the employer shall sell the objects' In such a situation there
would be literally, and in my opinion, as a matter of law, a
"combination of capital, skill or acts by two or more persons"
for the forbidden purpose of fixing prices (Bus. & Prof.
Code, § 16720), with the union its nexus.
I recognize that the United States Supreme Court has
taken a different view of the Sherman Act as amended by
the Clayton Act (and as inevitably affected by the NorrisLa Guardia, Wagner, and Taft-Hartley Acts) from that which
I suggest concerning the Cartwright Act. (AUen Bradley
Co. v. Local Union No.3 (1945), 325 U.S. 797, 809, 810 [65
S.Ct. 1533, 89 L.Ed. 1939].) Under federal law a union
can combine to restrain commerce when it acts "alone" (e.g.,
does not enter into a competition-restraining agreement with
a group of employers but rather "picks off" such employers
one by one) and in union self-interest (e.g., to destroy an
employer's business because of "personal antagonism" rather
than to better working conditions; Hunt v. Crurnboch (1945),
325 U.S. 821, 824-825 [65 S.Ct. 1545, 89 L.Ed. 1954]). I am
not here concerned with and express no opinion as to the
relevance of morals and emotions to some hypothetical case.
I am concerned with, and cannot join in, implications of the
majority that this court under California law should reach
the same result concerning the propriety of a union which
acts "alone" to restrain trade as the United States Supreme
Court apparently has felt compelled to reach in reconciling
federal acts which declare the policies of Congress on the
one hand "to preserve a competitive business economy" and
on the other hand "to prescrve the rights of labor to organize
to better its conditions through the agency of collective bargaining" (Allen Bradley Co. v. Local Union No.3 (1945),
supra, p. 806 of 325 U.S.).
Probably the California courts when they originally announced that the common law of this state forbade combina-
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tions in restraint. of trade (e.g., Santa OZara Valley 'Mill &
Lumbrr Co. v. Hayes (1888), 76 Cal. 387, 392 [18 P. 39],
9 Am.St.TIpp. 211]) and the Legislature W}J(>l1 H p.naeted t}l('
Cartwright Act (Stats. ]907, ch. 530) were chiefly concerned
with the dangers of combination of businessmelJ-enpit;;list<:. nut
of laborers (see similar comment as to the ]890 PIUlctmpnt
of the Sherman Act in .Apex Hosiery CO. Y. Lradn' (1940),
310 U.S. 469, 492 [60 8.Ct. 982, 84 L.Ed. 1311, 128 A.L.R.
1044], although during the congressional debates preceding
adoption of the Sherman Act, an amendment exempting labor
unions was offered and rejected; see Loewe v. Lawlor (1908),
208 U.S. 274, 301 [28 S.Ot. 301, 52 L.Ed. 488], the Danbury
Hatters' case). And probably the dangers of combinations
among businessmcn and organized labor to restrain trade were
not much in the minds of the courts when they originally
announced that under the common law of this state workmen
could combine and act in concert against employers to better
working ('onditions (J. F. Pm'kinson Co. v. Building Trades
Council (1908),154 Cal. 581 [98 P. 1027, 16 Ann.Cas. 1165,
21 L.R.A.N.S. 550]), or much in the minds of the legislators
when, recognizing tllat literal1y the Cartwright Act could
be applied to outlaw labor unions, they promptly amended
such act (Stats. 1909, ch. 362) to provide that labor was not
a commodit~' within its meaning. But in Overla,nd Pub. Co.
v. H. S. CI'ocker' Co. (1924), 193 Cal. 109, 115 [4], 117 [5,6]
[222 P. 812], this court was confronted with a combination
behveen a price-fixing trade association and unions of workmen emplo~'ed in tIle trade, b~T virtue of which combination
the union employes of plaintiff, a businessman' who refuscd
to join the trade association, werc called out for the purpose
of compelling plaintiff to join such association or be destroyed.
The court determined that the combination violated the Cartwright Act, and that neither tllat act's provision that labor
was not a commodity within its mcaning, nor the commonlaw right of workmen to organize and act in concert for
betterment of their working conditions, gave immunity to the
subject restraint of trade.
In today's economy we are confronted with new alignments
which haye the inevitable effect, if not the avowed purpose,
of restraining trade. The union's role in such alignments is
neither that of a helpless tool of a combination of capitalists
nor that of willing and equal coconspirator with businessml'n.
Rather, the union assumes the initiative and attempts to coerce

)

)

Apr. 1%0)

}'l[':~~'~EIl ~' .•1oull·q:nn:>; BARBEllS ETC.
INTER>;ATlOl':AL rNION

911

153 C.2<I 873; 4 Cal.Rnlr. 179. 351 P.2d 347]

businessmen to restrain trade. I t}link (parap11rasing language of the Allen Bradley Co. case (J945), supra, p. 808
of 325 U.S., with reference to the Sherman Act) that the
California Legislature never intended that unions could, consistently with the Cartwright Act, coerce employers-including employers who are also working union members-to control
the prices of goods and services; this principle is even more
obviously true in respect to the many barber shops wherein
there are no real employes and all service is furnished by
the proprietors themselves.
As pointed out in my dissent in Petri (ante, pp. 475-476,
477-479), the majority there declined to give effect either
to the (k('isiollal principles of sta·re dcc£sis or to the statutory
law as enacted in Labor Code, section 923 and related sections; today, as hereinabove shown, to the statutory law to
be disregarded in labor relations cases, the same majority
add the Cartwright Act. Daniel Webster said, at the funeral
of Justice Story, "Justice is the great iuterest of man on
earth." Regrettably, justice is not served by the majority's
decision in Petri or their decision today.
By departing' lightly from the principle of stare decisis
the majority, in my view, strike at the stability of the law
and the certainty with which its effect may be known; likewise, by failing to evenhandedly uphold aud apply a valid
statute, whether liked or disliked by the individual justices,
they contribute further to the uncertainties of the law. And
by refusing to accept the findings of basic facts and the
drawing of reasonable inferenees of ultimate, legally operative facts by a trial judge whose determinations in this regard
rest upon evidence which, according to normal rules of appellate review, is legally sufficient, the majori1y encouragp
appeals-already too frequent-which improperly seek ap.
pellate invasion of the province of the trial judge, jury, or
administrative fact-finder. All this, I fear, must tend not
only to increase the financial burdens of litigants, "he case
loads of courts, and the delays of the law but also, inevitably,
to depreciate the esteem in which the law and its servitorsthe courts and the judges and the lawyers-are held. It seems
reasonable to suppose that the public will aeeord no higher
respect to this court's decisions than the court itself examples.
For the reasons above stated, I would affirm the judgment.
Spence, J., and McComb, J., concurred.

